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Introduction
Developing nations1 are constructing infrastructure2 on a massive scale. 3
Infrastructure provides the framework necessary for a nation's economic
growth 4 and consists primarily of public utilities,5 public works, 6 and
transportation.7 More specifically, infrastructure is comprised of facilities
1. Throughout this note, the terms "developing" and "developed" nations will be
used to reflect the distinction between those nations that, respectively, tend to receive
and tend to provide foreign assistance and foreign direct investment funds.
2. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994 - INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
DEVELOPMENT 1 (1994) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994].
3. See THE WORLD BANK, 1993 WORLD BANK INFRASTRUCTURE SymPosiuM 11 (1993)
[hereinafter SYMpOsiuM]; Div. ON TRANSNAT'L CORS. AND INVESTMENT, THE WORLD BANK,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 60 (1994) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT] ("South,
East, and South-East Asia alone will need more than $1 trillion to finance infrastructure
and industrial projects over the next decade."). It has been estimated that at least two
trillion dollars over the course of the next decade will be required to meet the demand
for infrastructure in the developing nations of the world. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1994, supra note 2, at 95.
4. Infrastructure is "if not the engine, then the 'wheels' of economic growth."
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 14. Infrastructure is essential to the
prosperity of households and the productivity of businesses. Id. at 13. There is a strong
correlation between the quantity and quality of a nation's infrastructure, and both that
nation's per capita Gross Domestic Product and its household income levels. Id. at 14,
16.
5. This category includes: power plants, gas and oil pipelines, telecommunica-
tions, water supply, sanitation and sewerage, solid waste collection and disposal.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 13.
6. This category includes: major dams and canals for irrigation, and roads and
highways. Id.
7. This category includes: railways, urban transport systems such as subways and
tramways, ports, waterways and airports. Id.
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for transportation, power generation, water provision, sanitation (includ-
ing wastewater treatment), telecommunications, and irrigation. Currently,
private foreign direct investment8 funds industrial development in develop-
ing nations at an unprecedented rate. 9 In order to attract foreign capital
for production and manufacturing projects as well as to retain domestic
capital that might otherwise take "flight" to more developed economies
and more secure investments, a developing nation must have a well-devel-
oped infrastructure. 10 Further, developing nations are increasingly com-
peting with each other for scarce foreign investment funds. Foreign and
domestic investors will consider the condition of and prospects for a poten-
tial investee's infrastructure as a major criterion in making investment deci-
sions.1 1 Consequently, developing nations have great incentives to
construct as much infrastructure as possible, as quickly as possible.
Rapid development of infrastructure has brought many developing
nations both rapid economic growth 12 and massive environmental degra-
dation. 13 The latter 14 occurs in large part because developing nations gen-
8. The International Monetary Fund defines foreign direct investment as:
[an] investment that reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a
resident entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in another economy
.... The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship
between the direct investor and the [invested-in] enterprise and a significant
degree of influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise.
CHANDER KANT, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL FLIGHT 3 (1996).
9. Foreign direct investment flows into developing nations are at their highest levels
ever. See WORLD INVESTMNar REPORT, supra note 3, at 40.
10. KANT, supra note 8, at 3.
11. See id.; FOREIGN DIREcr INVESTMENT IN THE SEACEN CouNmEs vii (Azizah Talib
ed., 1994); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 28 ("Intensified efforts
by some developing countries... to improve their domestic infrastructure (especially
transportation and communications), including improvements secured through priva-
tization involving foreign direct investment, will play a role in maintaining the level and
growth of investment flows."). "Adequate quantity and reliability of infrastructure are
key factors in the ability of countries to compete in international trade ...." Id. at 17.
12. While the Gross National Product (GNP) of the United States has grown only 1.7
percent annually for the period 1980-1992, the GNP of many developing nations has far
outstripped that figure. For example, during the same period, Singapore's GNP grew 5.3
percent, Chile's 3.5 percent, Thailand's 6.0 percent, China's 7.6 percent, and the Repub-
lic of Korea's 8.5 percent. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 162.
13. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1-3,
7, 9 (1992) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992]; ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT,
WORLD BANK, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SOURCEBOOK viii (1991) [hereinafter ENvI-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SOuRCEBOOK] (Constructing new infrastructure has "major
potential for negative environmental impact."); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra
note 2, at 87 ("As the scale of infrastructure projects grows, environmental conse-
quences become increasingly significant."); Daniel C.K. Chow, Recognizing the Advan-
tages of Taiwan's Direct Participation in International Environmental Law Treaties, 14
STAN. ENVrL. L. J. 256, 257 (1995) ("Long one of the world's most densely populated
areas [Taiwan] now confronts catastrophic public health and pollution problems caused
by explosive industrial growth that has occurred almost completely unchecked by envi-
ronmental controls.").
Whole developing regions suffer increasing environmental degradation raised by their
rapid economic development. See JEFFREY S. HAMMER & SUDHIR SHIrrY, EAST ASIA'S ENvI-
RONMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES FOR ACTION 4 (1995) (stating that, "[i]f unchecked,
the pace of environmental damage from pollution and over extraction of renewable
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erally fail to mitigate sufficiently, by regulation or otherwise, the effects of
infrastructure development, industrial development, and resource exploita-
tion.15 For the most part, these nations lack developed environmental leg-
islation and sufficient institutional and administrative capacity to enforce
such legislation. 16 Consequently, much of the environmental cost of devel-
opment is externalized and is borne by the natural environment and its
users.
17
resources threatens to compromise the welfare gains in East Asia from higher
incomes."). East Asia is not alone in having environmental problems from unregulated
development. In several nations, the urban air is of such poor quality that oxygen is sold
from booths in the streets. See Clinton A. Vince, Integrated Resource Planning: The Case
for Exporting Comprehensive Energy Planning to the Developing World, 25 CAsE W. REs.
INT'L LJ. 371, 397 (1993) (discussing the practice in Hungary); The Cost of Not Protect-
ing the Environment, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 6, 1991, at A1O (discussing the practice in
Mexico); Consortium for International Development, Proceedings of the Eighth CID Presi-
dential Symposium, at 4-8 (Occasional Paper No. CID/01/92, July 25, 1991) (stating that
"[m]ore than 50 million people are now exposed to hazardous levels of air pollution in
[Latin America and the Caribbean]").
14. Environmental degradation may be broken into three categories: 1) unsustain-
able consumption of natural resources, including land use for agriculture; 2) pollution
from manufacturing and from the development and operation of infrastructure; and 3)
degradation consequent to large, concentrated populations. Examples of the first cate-
gory are mining and forestry. Examples of the second are chemical effluents flushed
into waterways and coal smoke from a power plant. Examples of the third are degraded
water quality from inadequately treated sewage and lead and particulate matter in a
city's air.
15. See GUNNAR ESKELAND & EMMANUEL JIMINEZ, CHOOSING POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR
POLLUTION CONTROL 2 (1991).
16. See id.; David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of Inter-
national Laws Protecting the Marine Environment, 19 MICH J. INT'L L. 497, 513 n.72
(1998) (citing Brad Knickerbocker, World Opens Eyes to Environment, CHRISTIAN SCI,
MONITOR, May 23, 1990, at 6, col. 2 (noting that India's environmental agency has just
two lawyers to track lawbreakers); T.M. Sen, Environment Planning for Industry in tile
Developing Countries, 11 INT'L Bus. LAw. 55, 56 (1983) (comparing the relative effective-
ness of different countries' regulatory agencies); Karen A. Goldberg, Comment, Efforts to
Prevent Misuse of Pesticides Exported to Developing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regula-
tion and Notification, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1025, 1030 (1985) ("The entire staff of a ministry
of agriculture in a developing country may consist of only one or two people with 'noth-
ing but a motorcycle and no fuel."') (quoting an interview with L. Caltagirone, Professor
of Entomology at the Center for Biological Control, University of California, Berkeley
and Advisor to USAID in Central America (May 11, 1984)).
17. In economic terms, absent regulation, the environmental impact of a course of
conduct is a classic externality. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoaRHAus, Eco-
NOMICS 32 (15th ed. 1995); ROBmRT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 43-44 (2d ed. 1996). If the environmental consequences of an
action, for example, air pollution by a coal-fired power plant, are not included in either
the cost of obtaining the inputs to the entity or in the market price of the action's output,
the cost is externalized, that is, it is not borne by the party responsible for the polluting
action. In this example, the costs of the coal and of fitting the plant to minimize the
pollution of the air are typically not included in the cost calculation of the facility, nor
are they included in the price of the product, electricity. The result of the externaliza-
tion is the imposition of a cost upon the environment and on the users of the degraded
environment. In the example of the power plant, one such cost is the damage to the
water and soil downwind from the plant due to the release of acid rain created by the
sulfurous emissions of the power plant. Typically, however, these costs can be internal-
ized by means of regulations which require that the actor harming the environment take
precautions to minimize this imposition of costs upon the environment and its users.
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Why don't developing nations more effectively regulate environmental
degradation within their borders? There are several reasons, the foremost
among them are: 1) lack of financial and technical resources; and 2) given
the global competition for capital, a reluctance to impede their infrastruc-
ture development by imposing the additional cost of environmental regula-
tion upon developers. As a result, the environment and its users in a given
developing nation are, in effect, subsidizing the nation's infrastructure and
economic base, thereby increasing the nation's competitiveness in the mar-
ket for foreign and domestic capital.
Developing nations often fail to promulgate and enforce regulations or
other mechanisms that would encourage internalization of environmental
costs imposed by infrastructure projects because their policy makers
believe that including environmental costs in the calculus of a particular
project increases the cost of development. To promote economic growth,
public environmental resources are often completely sacrificed or allowed
to be significantly degraded. These nations fear that higher development
costs in the short term will stifle economic growth. In these nations,
scarce public financial and technical resources are not allocated to environ-
mental regulation. Developing nations, therefore, have strong economic
incentives not to regulate their environments. In fact, they have incentives
to use the environment as a form of subsidy for development. To bear out
these assertions, this Note examines project finance, a prominent means of
development that is increasingly used to construct infrastructure facilities
in developing nations. By analyzing how national environmental regula-
tion functions in project finance specifically, this Note draws some descrip-
tive as well as normative conclusions about national environmental
regulation generally.
Project finance is an increasingly popular means of developing infra-
structure in developing nations' 8 and the vehicle by which a significant
amount of private foreign direct investment is made in developing
nations.19 Typically, infrastructure facilities significantly impact the natu-
See ESKELAND & JIMINEZ, supra note 15, at 50; PERCIVAL Er AL., supra, at 47-48, 133, fig.
2.4.
18. Project finance has been defined as:
[an] arrangement of debt, equity, and credit enhancement for the construction
or refinancing of a particular facility in a capital-intensive industry, in which
lenders base credit appraisals on the projected revenues from the operation of
the facility, rather than on the general assets or the corporate credit of the pro-
moter of the facility, and in which they rely on the assets of the facility, includ-
ing the revenue-producing contracts and cash flow, as collateral for the debt.
Scott Hoffman, A Practical Guide to Transactional Project Finance: Basic Concepts, Risk
Identification, and Contractual Considerations 45 Bus. LAW. 181, 181 n.1 (1989).
19. See UNiTED NATIONS INDusTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, FOREIGN DIRECT
INvEsTMENT FLOWS TO DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs: RECENT TRENDs, MAJOR DETRIMENTS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 19 (1990); WORLD DEVELoPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 92-
93; FOREIGN DIRECT INVEsTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 42 (Manuel R. Agogin ed., 1995); LAu-
RENCE CocKcROFr & ROGER C. RIDDELL, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SuB-SAHARAN
AFRICA 15-16 (1991); CYNTHIA, DAY WALLACE ET AL., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
1990s: A NEw CLIMATE IN THE THIRD WORLD 4 (1990).
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ral environment.20 For the purposes of this Note, the regulation of the
environmental effects of project financed infrastructure facilities is perti-
nent for three reasons. First, these facilities are causing an increasingly
larger percentage of the harm to the environment taking place in the devel-
oping world. Therefore, a better understanding of how to effectively regu-
late the environmental impact of these facilities is needed. Second, project
finance transactions must effectively allocate all risks and costs in order to
increase the chances of the project remaining financially viable. Therefore,
project financings are likely to be the "state of the art" of environmental
risk and cost allocation. Project finance transactions use a variety of
means to allocate both the environmental costs21 of a project and the risks
associated with such costs - the so-called "environmental risk."2 2 These
methods of allocation are analogous to the range of generally available
methods to regulate environmental costs and risks. Therefore, an analysis
of these methods in the context of project finance illuminates what will and
will not effectively mitigate the environmental degradation caused by eco-
nomic growth in the developing world. The project financed transaction's
20. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1994, supra note 2, at 21-22; infra notes 29-74 and
accompanying text.
21. "Environmental costs" can mean two different things. First, it means the costs
that are imposed by the decisions of the project's owners and participants to engage in
more costly, less environmentally harmful conduct during the course of their business.
In this sense, environmental costs are internalizations of the environmental impact of a
course of conduct. See AsiAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT -
DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr ASSESSMENT 9 (1991). For exam-
ple, the cost of putting a scrubber on a smokestack to clean emissions is an environmen-
tal cost in this sense of the term. Another example of this first type of cost is the cost of
cleaning up an oil spill.
Because project financings are profit-driven, such decisions to assume a cost that
otherwise could be imposed on the environment typically are not made spontaneously
but instead are prompted by a rule, whether it is a rule of public or private law. An
example of the former is a law of the host country mandating that the project emit no
more than ten tons of sulfur dioxide a month or else it will be fined. An example of the
latter is a contractual obligation owed by one party, A, to another, B, in which A agrees
to clean up any oil spills resulting from plant operations. Note, however, that such a
contract term probably would not appear unless a public rule mandated cleanup of oil
spills, because a rational, profit-seeking party would not choose to impose a cost upon
himself unless prompted to do so. In fact, prompting internalization is the goal of envi-
ronmental policies. See ESKELAND & JIMINEZ, supra note 15, at 50. Thus, public
lawmakers are ultimately responsible for establishing rules to impose the costs of inter-
nalizing the environmental impact of particular conduct.
The second type of environmental costs are externalities, the costs of degrading the
natural environment and imposing a cost upon its users because of a failure to suffi-
ciendy internalize the cost. An example of such a cost is the harm to the soil, water and
wildlife from an oil spill. Additionally, any residual damage that remained after any
clean-up of the oil spill would also be an externality and an environmental cost in the
second sense of the term.
22. Environmental risk can be defined as the probability that the cost of any degra-
dation of the natural environment caused by the operation of a facility will be imposed
upon the stakeholders in that facility by public or private law or other means. See
ALBERT R. WILSON, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT 24 (1991);
Eugene W. Goodwillie Jr. et al., Projects in the 1990s: Risks in Project Finance, in WHITE
& CASE, INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT FINANCE 10-11 (1995).
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allocation of environmental risks and costs serves as a useful case study in
the process of allocation of these costs generally.
Third, and most importantly, the individual project financed facility is
a close analog to the development of industry and infrastructure generally
because project financing involves the same parties with the same interests
as are generally involved in large-scale development. In the private sector,
these parties include: equity investors (including domestic and foreign
investors from wealthy developed nations); banks (both domestic and for-
eign who provide financing for both the construction and the long-term
operation of the facility); and insurers (who hedge the project's commer-
cial, political and other risks).23 In the public sector, the important inter-
ests that participate both in project financings and in large-scale
development include: the government of the nation hosting the project
(which is interested in the provision of services to its people, the provision
of an investment that is both appealing to investors and potential investors,
and is also interested in the manner in which the environmental common-
wealth is disposed of); and the people of the nation (because they are
involved as consumers of the output of the facility and as users of the natu-
ral environment that is affected by the facility).24
This Note begins with the assumption that mitigation of the environ-
mental effects of development is necessary if development is to be sus-
tained.25 Few would disagree that development should be sustained as
long as possible. The only disagreement is about how rapidly development
should occur and what degree of environmental damage is consistent with
sustainability. Almost unanimously, academics point to international reg-
ulation of the environment as the best means of mitigating the environmen-
tal effects of the world's development.26 This Note takes a different
position. In fact, it is regulation at the national level that will best limit the
environmental degradation wrought by development on such a massive
scale. With respect to monitoring the environment and allocating environ-
mental risks and costs, developing nations should emphasize the establish-
ment of what can be called environmental infrastructures, legal
frameworks that complement their development of physical infrastructures
of roads, ports and power plants.27 Specifically, developing nations must
23. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. Sustainable development is development that meets "the essential needs of the
world's poor" yet will not disable "future generations [from meeting] their own needs."
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43
(1987), cited in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58 (Winifred Lang
ed., 1994) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
26. See, e.g., Trends in International Environmental Law 11, 112 (Harvard Law
Review eds., 1992); VED NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 4-5, 309
(1995); INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 7-8 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirs-
ten Engel eds., 1995); JONAS EBBESON, COMPATIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
LAw xviii (1996); BERND RuSTER & BRUNO SIMMA, 1 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS iii (1975).
27. In this respect, the Author concurs with the environmental lawyer who, speaking
of the 1992 United Nations climate convention's non-binding declarations' effect upon
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establish effective national environmental regulatory infrastructures
(NERI) 28 to police their nations' environments. However, because of their
lack of financial and technical resources combined with the disincentive,
given the competition for capital, to increase the cost of their development,
the developed world must contribute substantial financial and technical
assistance to achieve this result.
Part I of this Note discusses the environmental impact of the rapid
growth of infrastructure in the developing world. Part II outlines the
expansion of foreign direct investment, in particular the increasing use of
project finance to develop infrastructure. To illustrate that existing meth-
ods of environmental regulation are insufficient to ensure even basic pro-
tection of the environments of both individual developing nations and the
globe, Part II then evaluates the various methods used to allocate environ-
mental risk in project financed transactions. Part III proposes that the best
way to manage the environmental effects of infrastructure development is
to develop NERIs in developing nations. Next, this Part sets out one possi-
bility for the development of national environmental regulatory systems,
with specific examples from individual developing nations. Finally, Part III
addresses several of the central challenges to the development of effective
NERIs and recommends that particular features be included in these
NERIs.
I. The Environmental Impact of Large-Scale Development in the
Developing World
Developing nations suffer from massive environmental degradation as a
consequence of the construction of infrastructure and exploitation of their
resources without commensurate planning to mitigate the environmental
effects of this development.2 9 Compounding the environmental degrada-
tion, developing nations contain roughly eighty-five percent of the world's
population. This already high percentage is increasing, and this rate of
population growth compounds these problems because the larger the pop-
ulation, the greater the demand for development and the consumption of
regulation of the environment, stated that they would serve as, "[t]he foundation for
meeting the challenge . . .but it needs the mortar and the bricks to get beyond the
basement." PERcivAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 1265. National regulatory systems are that
mortar and brick. See also William Wilson, Environmental Law as Development Assist-
ance, 22 Etnr_. L. 953, 966 (1992) (arguing that "much more needs to be done to give
developing countries the capacity to enact and implement environmental laws on a par
with those of the developed world . . .[because w]ithout this, there will always be a
missing link in the global chain of environmental protection.").
28. See infra Part III. An effective NERI would include, at a minimum: a comprehen-
sive environmental health strategy; comprehensive environmental legislation; regula-
tions implementing that legislation; an administrative agency with laboratory facilities,
sufficient enforcement and compliance monitoring capacity, and with effective coordina-
tion with other national administrative agencies and any sub-national government
authorities with environmental responsibilities. See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN
DEVELOPING CouNrTRns 250 n.30 (Denizhan Er6cal ed., 1991).
29. See infra notes 32-68 and accompanying text.
Vol. 31
1998 Think Globally, (En)Act Locally
resources.30 Additionally, as these populations grow and become more
concentrated, managing the harms they impose upon the environment
becomes more difficult and costly.3 1
A. Nine Categories of Environmental Degradation
There are nine types of environmental degradation that continue to take
place around the world as a consequence of nations' development.
* Deteriorating Air Quality
The combustion of fossil fuels for power generation and transportation
exposes about 1.3 billion urban residents worldwide to air pollution
levels above recommended limits. 32 Daily, people breathe air that con-
tains levels of sulphur dioxide, lead and suspended particulate matter
(SPM) that exceed World Health Organization standards.33 The
problems associated with air pollution include: human health problems,
such as increased colds and rhinitis, chronic bronchitis, emphysema,
lung cancer, and lead poisoning;3 4 animal health problems from pollu-
tants, such as sulfur or metals that precipitate out of the air in the form
of acids or other toxins, and that poison downwind bodies of water and
soil; 35 and negative effects on materials, such as metals, stone or
concrete.
3 6
* Deteriorating Water Quality
Defects in water quality occur because of surface and underground
water pollution. As a nation develops, it moves from polluting the water
with "human and animal wastes, pathogenic organisms from this waste,
and sediment from unsound farming and timbering practices" to pollut-
ing it with those things plus "heat, toxic metals, acids, pesticides, and
organic chemicals."'3 7 For example, power generation causes significant
water pollution from coal mining run-off and heat discharges made by
the power plant's cooling systems.3 8 A survey of rivers in developing
countries during the 1980s showed that their water quality, as measured
by dissolved oxygen, was steadily worsening.3 9 As to health effects, the
"use of polluted waters for drinking and bathing is one of the principal
30. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 26.
31. See Frances Cairncross, Environmental Pragmatism: Environmental Damage in
Underdeveloped Countries, FOREIGN POLICY, Jun. 22, 1994, at 35.
32. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALm 96
(1993) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993].
33. Richard L. Ottinger, Energy and Environmental Challenges for Developed and
Developing Countries, 9 PACE ENVTI.. L. REv. 55, 65 (1991); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1993, supra note 32, at 96.
34. DANIEL D. CHIRAS, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE - ACTION FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUrURE
343-44 (1991).
35. Id. at 345.
36. Id. Note that each of these effects carries high economic costs - i.e. health care,
loss of animal resources, deterioration of buildings and other assets.
37. CHiRAs, supra note 34, at 377; WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13,
at 45-47.
38. See Ottinger, supra note 33, at 68.
39. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 46.
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pathways for infection by diseases that kill millions and sicken more
than a billion each year."40 Additionally, pollution kills or toxifies fish
and shellfish that would otherwise be an essential part of the diets of
billions of people and provide many millions with a livelihood.41
" Atmospheric Change42
Global warming and ozone depletion are the two primary environmental
concerns for the future. Global warming is caused by a buildup of car-
bon dioxide and other gasses in the atmosphere. 43 Carbon dioxide is
believed to be the primary greenhouse gas and is a by-product of human
activities such as burning fossil fuels. 44 Carbon dioxide in the atmos-
phere acts as a blanket, trapping heat that would otherwise dissipate
into space. 45 The predicted effects of global warming are reduced grain
and other agricultural production; more frequent forest and grassland
fires; and a reduction in the polar ice caps, inundating coastal areas. 46
Ozone depletion is caused by increasing levels of chlorine in the atmos-
phere which chemically interacts with the ozone, thereby depleting it. 4 7
Although difficult to predict, ozone depletion and increased ultra-violet
radiation may have long term consequences such as health problems
and less productive fishing and agriculture development. 48
" Environmental Deterioration in Urbanized Areas Consequent to Population
Growth
By the year 2000, it is projected that at least twenty-two cities around the
world will have populations over ten million and sixty more will measure
over five million.4 9 Population alone, even if well managed, creates envi-
ronmental problems. The demand for and consumption of resources as
well as the disposal of waste correlates with population growth. Tens of
millions of city dwellers now suffer from polluted air and a lack of clean
water.5
0
" Soil Degradation and Deforestation
It is estimated that "somewhere between 30% and 50% of the world's
forests have already been destroyed .... "5 Extensive logging or surface
mining results in erosion of the soil that was formerly held in place by
40. Id. at 48.
41. Id. at 46.
42. See id. at 61-63.
43. See CHiRAS, supra note 34, at 346 ("Between 1870 and 1989, global concentra-
tions of CO 2 increased 21.5% (from 290 to 352 parts per million).... The best global
climate computer models predict that a doubling of CO 2 will increase the average daily
temperature by about 20 to 50.").
44. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 61.
45. See id. at 61, box 2.4.
46. See CHInAs, supra note 34, at 346-49; WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra
note 13, at 62.
47. See CHIRAS, supra note 34, at 360.
48. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 62.
49. See CmRAS, supra note 34, at 105.
50. See HAmMER & SHErrY, supra note 13, at 4. The problem that Hammer and
Shetty describe in East Asian cities is common to cities throughout the developing
world. See Ottinger, supra note 33, at 65.
51. See CHIRAS, supra note 34, at 194.
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the trees or the surface soil.52 The runoff of soils into streams and bod-
ies of water results in damage to fisheries and causes siltation of dams,
irrigation systems, and transport channels.5 3 Deforestation is also
harmful because of another ecological function of trees: trees provide a
habitat for various species of wildlife; regulate the hydrologic cycle by
influencing watershed flows of surface and groundwaters; and take car-
bon out of the atmosphere.5 4
Destruction of Biological Diversity
Biological diversity is a "composite of genetic information, species, and
ecosystems... [It] provides material wealth in the form of food, fiber,
medicine, and inputs into industrial processes."55 Development and its
residual pollution destroy individual species as well as whole ecosys-
tems. For example, the decline of a fruit bat in Malaysia in the 1970s
was caused by shrimp farmers' conversion of the swamps where the bat
fed, as well as by quarrying in the limestone caves where the bat lived.56
This species of bat pollinated the fruit-bearing durian trees that were the
heart of a $100 million-dollar-a-year fruit industry and the bat's demise
resulted in a fall-off in fruit production, jeopardizing the industry's
future. When the bat's importance was realized, efforts were taken to
ensure that it had adequate food and cave space. Eventually, the bat and
the fruit trees recovered.5 7 These complex linkages between different
parts of the natural system are the unforeseeable results of large scale
development that alters the natural environment.
Deterioration of Coastal Resources (particularly wetlands, coastlines, and
estuaries)58
Because waterfront property is highly valued for both its aesthetic value
and its commercial potential, coastal regions such as estuaries are prime
locations for development. Wetlands are often viewed as just "swamps"
and draining and developing them is perceived as a more valuable use of
the land.5 9 The fact that these areas are among the most important for
the generation and sustenance of both water- and land-dwelling crea-
tures often goes unrecognized.60 In addition to serving as breeding
grounds for fish and other wildlife, wetlands absorb excess water, restor-
ing groundwater supplies, and filter out the fertilizers used in agricul-
ture.61 Similarly, estuaries are an integral part of the life cycles of about
two-thirds of all fish and shellfish species. 62 They also filter out pollu-
tants from upstream, including agricultural fertilizers, sewage, and
52. See id. at 196.
53. See id. at 145.
54. See id.
55. WORLD DEvELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 59.
56. See id. box 2.3.
57. Id.
58. See Consortium for International Development, supra note 13, at 4 (discussing
the problem in Latin America and the Caribbean).
59. See CHIRAS, supra note 34, at 231.
60. See id. at 230-31.
61. See id. at 230.
62. See id. at 232.
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industrial waste. 63 Development of wetlands often destroys their func-
tion as a natural habitat because they are partially or completely drained
to make way for housing, recreation, or industrial facilities.6 4 Develop-
ment of estuaries often results in pollution with petroleum products or
siltation from upstream soil erosion.6 5 Also, upstream use of the water
from a river that empties into an estuary makes the brackish water of the
estuary too salty to sustain the species that depend upon it for their
habitat.6 6
* Pollution from Agro-chemicals
Agriculture in developing nations increasingly involves toxic chemical
fertilizers and pesticides, many of which are banned in developed coun-
tries for health reasons. These toxic agents are washed into streams and
bodies of water, polluting them and causing health hazards to humans
and wildlife. 67
* Deterioration of the Natural and Cultural Heritage of Indigenous
Communities
One commentator has observed that, "[elthnic groups and indigenous
communities whose survival is linked to traditional uses of natural
resources are now in serious danger of disappearing because of changes
in their habitats and acculturation. The search for and development and
utilization of ... natural resources, and the incursion of settlers into
indigenous lands have seriously impacted native peoples. '6 8
As this list indicates, there are tremendous environmental consequences to
the large scale development taking place throughout the developing world.
These consequences are extremely costly to individuals, nations, and the
global community. The next section describes the massive environmental
effects of only one development project in order to demonstrate the scale of
degradation involved in the development of three quarters of the world.
B. The Three Gorges Dam
The Three Gorges Dam project in China is a recent example6 9 of a develop-
ment project's impact on the environment. This single hydro-electric power
63. See id.
64. See id. at 231.
65. See id. at 232.
66. See id.
67. See Consortium for International Development, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing
the problem in Latin America and the Caribbean); RAUL BRAnES, INSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (1991).
68. Consortium for International Development, supra note 13, at 7.
69. For numerous other examples, see Stephanie C. Guyett, Note, Environment and
Lending: Lessons of the World Bank, Hope for the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 889 (1992), citing PHILLIPPE LE PRESTRE, THE
WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE (1989); STEVEN HELLINGER, AID FOR
JUST DEVELOPMENT: REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (1988); CHERYL PAYER,
THE WORLD BANK (1982); Bruce Rich, Funding Deforestation: Conservation Woes at the
World Bank, NATION, Jan. 23, 1989, at 73; ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, Damming the Third World:
Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform
Pressures on the Lending Process, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 121 (1988).
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generation project will create a reservoir covering 632 square kilometers,
require the relocation of twenty cities and 1.4 million people, inundate
28,000 acres of high-quality farmland, and potentially rob the world of sig-
nificant archaeological artifacts from one of the oldest inhabited regions
and cultures of the world.7 0 The Three Gorges area is also a popular visit-
ing spot for tourists as it possesses tremendous natural beauty.7 1 The pro-
ject will deny the downstream inhabitants use of the river for agriculture
and fishing, and may cause water quality problems for the area surround-
ing the dam because there will be insufficient flow in the dammed river to
dilute the discharged sewage. 72 Lastly, the dam project threatens to
destroy the habitats of four endangered species: the giant panda, the Sibe-
rian white crane, a river dolphin, and the Chinese alligator. 73
These are the environmental effects of only one project in one country.
The Three Gorges Dam project, the most massive hydroelectric power-gen-
eration plant ever developed with an estimated cost of $35 billion, repre-
sents only about three-and-a-half percent of the estimated $1 trillion of
infrastructure required in Asia alone in the next decade.74 The relocation
of about 1.4 million people required by the Three Gorges Dam project
seems to be a high price to pay. In fact, the relocation will probably cost
more than the actual dam construction. What prompted the decision mak-
ers to proceed with their plans for the dam in light of the project's massive
environmental impact? To answer this question, we must look at the shift-
ing attitudes in the developing world regarding how to balance the relative
values of economic development, on the one hand, and environmental
preservation on the other.
C. The "Right to Pollute" vs. Sustainable Development
Historically, developing nations perceived a conflict between a desire to
develop as rapidly as possible and a belief that the costs of environmental
regulation or protection, if imposed, would slow the growth of their econo-
mies.75 As a consequence, developing nations typically have favored expe-
70. See Marian E. Sullivan, The Three Gorges Dam Project: The Need for A Comprehen-
sive Assessment, 8 Gao. IN'L ENvTL. L. Rev. 109 (1995).
71. See id. at 119.
72. See id. at 118.
73. See id. at 120.
74. See WORLD INvEsTMENr REPORT, supra note 3, at 60.
75. Spokesmen for developing nations at the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, at Founex, Switzerland, June 4-12, 1971, expressed three
concerns:
[1] that the high cost of environmental clean-up and protection programs in the
developed countries might significantly reduce the amount of aid available for
development assistance and [2] that the capital costs of development would
increase as developed countries established new standards for factories and
technology being transferred to the developing world and [3] that the infusion
of sophisticated pollution control technologies would not only add to develop-
ment costs but would worsen the problem of inappropriate technology already
facing them.
H. Jeffrey Leonard, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A Polit-
ical Perspective, 17 STAN. ENVT'L L. J. 281, 283 n.4 (1981).
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dited development without extensive regulation 76 and have been
suspicious of pressure from developed nations to regulate their environ-
ments.77 Developing nations argue that they are entitled to the same bene-
fits as developed nations, which benefitted from externalizing the costs of
their own development.78 Traditionally, the law of nations entitles nation
states to this benefit. Sovereignty and "the right to pollute at self-deter-
mined levels,"79 limited only by the principle of sic utere,80 were the central
principles governing the relationship between development and environ-
mental conservation.81 Sovereign developing nations have asserted this
right to develop their resources as they see fit, and this right has been
76. Taiwan's experience is typical. Chow, supra note 13, at 257. Chow notes that:
During the past forty years, Taiwan has transformed itself from an impoverished
agrarian society into the world's twelfth largest trader and twentieth largest
economy. Taiwan's stunning economic rise has led to equally dramatic, though
often ignored, environmental problems .... [Tihis small island country now
confronts catastrophic public health and pollution problems caused by explo-
sive industrial growth that has occurred almost completely unchecked by envi-
ronmental controls.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
77. Leonard, supra note 75, at 282 n.2.
Sri Lanka's ambassador to the United Nations, at that time President of the
United Nations General Assembly, spoke for a majority of developing countries
during the early 1970s when he said: "[Dieveloping countries have of late been
warned of the price that has to be paid in the form of environmental pollution
for industrial development. All developing countries are aware of the risks, but
they would be quite prepared to accept from the developed countries even 100
percent of their gross national pollution if thereby they could diversify their
economies through industrialization."
Id.
78. There are, of course, counter-arguments. Today, the scale of the development is
so much greater than it was when the developed nations industrialized - i.e., from the
industrial revolution through the 1950's - that the environmental degradation caused
by the development of the vast majority of the planet would be devastating. Moreover,
today's pollutants are more toxic than the pollutants emitted by developed nations'
development - e.g., nuclear waste, PCBs, dioxin, asbestos - and such super-toxic pollu-
tion cannot be permitted. Lastly, in light of what we now know about the environmental
consequences of the development of the industrialized countries, it would be foolish and
destructive to pollute without regard for the known environmental impact of that
pollution.
79. E.B. Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emer-
gence of a New World Order, 81 GEo. LJ. 675, 704 (1993).
80. This is a "common law maxim meaning that one should use his own property in
such a manner as not to injure that of another." BLAcK'S LAw DICnONARY 1380 (6th ed.
1990); NANDA, supra note 26, at 2 (asserting that "[s]overeignty and the right to pollute
at self-determined levels," limited only by the principle of sic utere, were the central
principles governing the relationship between development and environmental
conservation).
81. These principles still figure, prominently in the relationship, but to a lesser
degree. As the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development stated:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the prin-
ciples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and development policies, and the respon-
sibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
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acknowledged by more-developed nations.8 2 Some developing nations that
have taken this approach and exercised their right to develop without
regard to the environmental costs have expanded their economies at rates
that far surpass the growth of more developed nations over the past
decade.8 3
There has, however, been a shift in the attitude of the global commu-
nity towards the pollution caused by such development. In response to the
widespread degradation of the natural environment resulting from infra-
structure development and operation, there has been increasing recogni-
tion at both the national and international levels of the environmental
costs of development.8 4 Consequently, many nations have rejected the
traditional "right to pollute" development approach described above and
have adopted instead a sustainable development approach. Sustainable
development has been defined as "development to meet the needs of the
present generation without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs."85 This approach, unlike the traditional develop-
ment approach, places a significant economic value on environmental
resources consumed or degraded in the process of development. This con-
sumption or degradation is calculated as a cost.8 6 By starting to regulate
See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, The Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, preamble, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1, 13 June
1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, principle 2 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
82. See id.
83. See Chow, supra note 13, at 257. See supra note 12.
84. See Leonard, supra note 75, passim. It should be noted that development can
also lead to substantial environmental benefits as well as costs. Any consideration of the
relationship between development and environmental preservation must acknowledge
the benefits of the development of facilities for treating sewage, for treating drinking
water, and for generating power which results in a decrease in burning of biomass which
is often a major cause of deforestation and is also grossly inefficient and polluting. See
WORLD DEVELOPmENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 7. Such facilities, however, are not
always beneficial given the different operating conditions in developing nations. See,
e.g., Alexander Shille, The Ganges' Next Life, Nav YoRKE, Jan. 19, 1998, at 58 (mention-
ing inoperability of Western designed and built sewage treatment plants due to frequent
power outages).
85. BRARuEs, supra note 67, at 5.
86. One of the obstacles to accounting for environmental costs is the difficulty of
evaluating those costs. Traditionally, the success of a nation's development program is
measured using market-based economic criteria, such as Gross National Product or
household income, that do not reflect the cost or value of harm to or protection of the
nation's natural environment. WILLIAM RYnE, Firsr WORLD, THIRD WORLD 219 (1995).
While markets are effective devices for evaluating many goods and services, they tend
not to be effective at evaluating environmental costs.
Markets frequently do not accurately reflect the social value of the environment,
for several reasons: [1] No market exists because it is difficult to enforce the
rights to own or use the environment - as with air quality. Thus, prices do not
reflect the adverse effects of pollutants, and the result is too much air pollution.
[2] Some uses for a resource are marketed but others are not - as with tropical
rainforests, where timber is marketed but watershed protection is not. The
nonmarketed benefits are frequently ignored, while other uses of the resource
are overexploited. [3] Open access to resources allows them to be exploited by
all - as with rainforests in the Amazon and sardines off the coast of Costa Rica.
In these instances, environmental effects are not recognized by users (and so
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the environmental effects of infrastructure development, many developing
nations are acknowledging that management of environmental resources is
crucial to their future,8 7 and that degradation of the environment carries
with it high costs that must be taken into account.88
become externalities). The results are deforestation and overfishing. [4] Indi-
viduals and societies lack information about environmental impacts or about
low-cost ways to avoid damage - as with the link between CFCs and ozone
depletion, which is only now fully appreciated. Private firms may not provide
better information because they find it difficult to capture the benefits.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 64-65.
87. In addition to environmental consciousness, international economic and polit-
ical forces are pushing developing nations to regulate their environments. Consumer
demand for "greener" products in the export-market, typically developed countries, has
led to increased regulation of manufacturing in developing nations. Thus, global com-
petition has been pushing developing nations to meet higher environmental standards
in their products and processes or lose export business. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COM-
MITTEE, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT CO-
OPERATION - 1994 REPORT 43 (1994). However, developing nations are suspicious that
the developed nations' pressure upon them to increase environmental regulation is indi-
rect trade protectionism. Id. ("A broad concern is that environmental claims may be
misused to try to justify damaging protectionist impulses."). Environmental regulation
of imports by more developed nations is seen to stem from protectionist motives, specifi-
cally, from developed nations' desire to protect their domestic producers from the pro-
ducers in less developed nations because the domestic producers have additional costs
imposed by environmental regulations.
Politically, international concern for the environment, particularly on the part of the
more developed nations, has put pressure on less developed countries to enact more
environmental legislation. Developed nations, which have contributed substantially to
protecting the global commons through enactment of legislation and enforcement (and,
increasingly, with international regulation and enforcement) do not want pollution by
unregulated developing nations to negate their efforts. See Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1996: Hearings on H.R.
1868 before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. II, 11 (1994). One U.S. official
has observed that:
[w]hen we in the U.S. and other developed countries have done all we respon-
sibly can do to protect the atmosphere and safeguard our shared oceans and
seas and the global commons from which we draw many of the products and the
materials we need, [it is important that] our efforts are not negated by the unreg-
ulated industrial and other actions of the populous developing world, the for-
mer Soviet Union, and other countries.
Id. (Statement of Richard N. Hellman, President, U.S. Committee for the United Nations
Environment Program).
88. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE, supra note 87, at 46.
As in the advanced countries, many Third World governments have established
programs and passed regulations to protect the environment and have created
new government agencies responsible for environmental affairs. A 1980 survey
by the Center for International Environmental Information noted that 102 devel-
oping countries now have governmental agencies with environmental manage-
ment responsibility, whereas only eleven Third World governments had such
agencies in 1972.
Leonard, supra note 75, at 282 (footnotes omitted). Governments in developing nations,
in the face of environmental harms caused by development, have "respond[ed] with
environmental legislation, strengthened environmental protection institutions, and
increased enforcement." INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, INVESTING IN THE ENVI-
RONMENT iii (1992).
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Project finance is increasingly being used to fund infrastructure devel-
opment in developing nations. Examining the means by which the nega-
tive environmental effects, as well as the risk of those effects, of project
financed infrastructure transactions are accounted for is a valuable case
study through which to observe the significant relationships between this
emerging environmental consciousness and the desire to both promote
economic growth and generate profits.
II. Project Finance and the Development of Infrastructure in
Developing Countries: A Case Study89
Historically, infrastructure projects have been public works funded by pub-
lic monies, usually either tax revenues or proceeds from bond sales.90
Infrastructure projects were typically too costly for any private concern to
undertake because of the large initial capital outlay, the slow rate of return,
and the risk that the project would never be profitable. In the past twenty
years, however, infrastructure development has increasingly become "pri-
vate works." More of the money invested in developing nations comes from
private sources and less from the public sector.91 Additionally, this private
funding increasingly comes from outside the developing nation in the form
of foreign direct investment.92 Building infrastructure now yields suffi-
89. The following treatment of the subject of project finance is at a level of detail that
serves only my purpose of demonstrating that the environmental consequences of
infrastructure development are not sufficiently regulated. For more detailed analyses of
project finance, see PETER NavrrT, PROJECT FINANCING (5th ed. 1989), the numerous
articles cited in Jay Facciolo, Project Finance, 11 B.U. Irr'L LJ. 169, n.13 (1993)
(reviewing CLIFFORD CHANCE, PROJECT FINANCE (1993)), and the articles cited in
Hoffman, supra note 18, at 181, 182 n.2.
90. Even with private funds accounting for an increasing amount of infrastructure
development, the vast majority of infrastructure development is still public. See WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 89 ("Developing countries now spend
around $200 billion a year on infrastructure investment, some 90 percent or more of it
derived from government tax revenues or intermediated by governments. The burden
on public finances is enormous."). There is so much infrastructure needed in the world,
particularly in developing nations, that even a minority of that development implicates
hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars, and impacts the quality of the environ-
ment in which billions of people live.
91. GARY BOND & LAURENCE CARTER, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, FINANC-
ING PRIVATE INFRAsI uCTuRE PROJECTS IX (1991) (stating that private financing "and man-
agement of infrastructure in developing countries is undergoing a renaissance as
governments in many countries give the private sector a larger role in providing infra-
structure services.").
The private investment-to-GDP ratio in developing countries rose by more than a
full percentage point to 18% and now stands some 6% higher than the low
reached in the middle of the 1980's. Public investment-to-GDP ratios continued
to slide. In 1994, average public investment rates in developing countries were
down to 6% of GDP - far below their average level of around 10% in the late
1970's.
FREDERICK Z. JASPERSEN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, TRENDS IN PRIVATE INVEST-
MENT IN DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs: STATISTICS FOR 1970-1994, at 1 (1995).
92. BOND & CARTER, supra note 91, at ix. Because foreign direct investment is an
increasing part of the total capital invested in developing nations, including capital
investment for infrastructure, attracting foreign capital is very important for the eco-
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cient profits to attract foreign investment capital to more risky developing
nations. The most important legal and financial means by which this shift
to private development has taken place is project financing. 93 To be suc-
cessful, a project financed facility must generate sufficient cash flows from
its operations both to service all of its obligations and to provide an ade-
quate return on the project sponsors' investments.94
Project sponsors' exposure to liability for the obligations of the project,
however, is very limited. If the cash flows are not sufficient to meet the
obligations of the project, creditors have limited or no recourse to the spon-
sors to recoup any losses they may suffer as a consequence of the project's
non-performance. 95 In fact, it is a sponsor's wish to participate in a project
nomic future of any particular developing nation. While developing nations frequently
employ private foreign direct investment to develop their infrastructure, the reasons
given for this increase vary. Some commentators say that private capital is used more
because the bargaining power of developing nations is greater. See, e.g., CYNTHIA DAY
WALLACE ET AL., FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTMENT IN THE 1990's: A NEw CLIMATE IN THE THIRD
WORLD 4 (1990) ("[One] explanation for the more positive attitude toward foreign
investment is that host governments in developing countries have become more confi-
dent in dealing with MNC's."). Other commentators believe that the reason for the
increase in private foreign direct investment is due to developing countries' need and the
lack of alternatives after the credit squeeze of the 1980s, when restructuring of both
private debt and public development aid took place. See, e.g., Gerald Pollio & Charles H.
Riemenschneider, The Coming Third World Investment Revival, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr.
1988, at 114, 118 ("[Mlany financing options previously available to the Third World
have dried up."). This difference between the explanations is important because it bears
on relative bargaining power of the host nation and the foreign investor which, in turn,
affects the choice a given nation will have of whether to impose costly environmental
regulations upon infrastructure projects.
93. There are several reasons why project finance is increasingly used to fund infra-
structure development. One factor is the trend to privatization of infrastructure. See
BOND & CARTER, supra note 91, at 1-3; SYMPosIUM, supra note 3, at 11-15. Further,
under-investment by many nations' utilities has left a backlog of unmet demand for
infrastructure services which hampers economic growth. Id. at 3. The reluctance of the
governments of developing nations to take on more debt also steers countries to foreign
investment. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 91 ("Where budgets
have been tightened for macroeconomic reasons, the large share that infrastructure rep-
resents in government investment has led to proportionately sharp reductions in spend-
ing in this sector."). In project financed transactions, "[t]he host countries benefit by
getting the needed infrastructure without incurring more sovereign debt." Pollio &
Riemenschneider, supra note 92, at 124. The reluctance of lenders in the developing
world, both public and private, to give aid or make loans to developing nations, leads to
the project finance solution. Id. at 114, 118 (identifying a "contraction of alternative
sources of private capital [for the Third World] - above all loans from commercial
banks."). Last, the development of innovative legal and financial techniques and the
globalization of financial markets presents more opportunities for innovative uses of
capital. Id.
94. See OvERsEAs PRIVATE INvEsTmENT CORPORATION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1995);
The entity carrying out the construction and often the operation of the facility is called
the promoter, sponsor, or the "special purpose corporation" (SPC) and is brought into
existence solely for the duration of a particular project. Id. Such projects are "normally
developed by forming a new company that has no other assets and no previous perform-
ance or credit standing." Robert Thornton Smith, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals
for Private Power Generation Projects in Developing Countries, 707 PLI/Comm 183, 195(1993). Hence the name, "project finance."
95. See GRAHAM VINTER, PROJECT FINANCE 111 (2d ed. 1998).
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with less exposure to project risks than he would incur if he managed the
transaction either out of corporate debt or by contributing significant
amounts of equity to the project that is usually the primary motivation
behind the project finance structure.9 6 That structure usually requires a
non-recourse or limited recourse loan, which means that:
lenders are repaid only from the cash flow generated by the project or, in the
event of complete failure, from the value of the project's assets. Lenders may
also have limited recourse to the assets of a parent company sponsoring a
project. An important policy question is whether the government [that is
hosting the project's] tax revenues should be used to provide recourse, in the
form of guarantees to lenders.9
7
The non-recourse nature of project finance means that a sponsor's other
assets are not put at risk by the success or failure of the specific project.9 8
Therefore, a sponsor may have a stake in the project's profits but will have
either no liability for the obligations of the project company beyond the
risk of losing his initial investment in the entity, or will have only limited
liability for those obligations.9 9
A project financing involves several different parties, each of which
agrees to bear certain project risks in exchange for certain benefits, finan-
cial or otherwise. The principal parties to a project financing include:
the Host Nation's Government, the Project Sponsors (i.e. developers and
active equity holders), Equity participants (i.e. passive equity holders),
Lenders (for both the construction and the permanent), Contractors (gen-
eral, sub-contractors, equipment suppliers), Operators [of the project facil-
ity], and Credit Enhancers (commercial insurers, specialty insurers - e.g.
political risk insurers and export credit insurers - performance bond issu-
ers and sureties, guarantors, letter of credit issuers). In many projects, there
are additional participants such as: technology owners, suppliers of inputs
to the project, offtakers and other users of project products.10 0
In international project finance transactions, a complex system of contracts
determines the relationships between these various parties.' 0 1 This system
of contracts in a basic project finance structure will generally include the
96. P.D. Slattery, Project Finance - An Overview, 6 CORP. & Bus. LJ. 62 (1993).
Other reasons why a sponsor would select a project finance structure are:
(i) elimination of, or limitation on the recourse nature of the financing of a
project, (ii) off-balance sheet treatment of debt financing, (iii) leverage of debt to
avoid dilution of existing equity, (iv) avoidance of restrictive covenants in either
debt or equity arrangements that would otherwise preclude project develop-
ment, and (v) arrangement of attractive debt financing and credit enhancement,
available to the project itself, but which is unavailable to the project sponsor as a
direct loan.
Hoffman, supra note 18, at 184.
97. WORLD DEVELoPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 94.
98. See Hoffman, supra note 18, at 185.
99. Of course, a sponsor could not avoid liability in the event that he made fraudu-
lent representations in connection with the financing. See generally S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 1486-1509 (3d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1988).
100. EUGENE W. GOODWMILLIE, JR., PROJEcTS IN THE 1990'S: RISKS IN PROJECt FINANCE 1
(1993)
101. See ViNTER, supra note 95, at 23.
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following: 1) a concession agreement in which the host government grants
the project company a long-term right to engage in the relevant indus-
try;10 2 2) an output or offtake agreement in which the host country agrees
to purchase the total output of the project, or at least a fixed amount;10 3 3)
an engineering, procurement, and construction contract in which the project
company agrees with the contractor on the terms and specifications for
construction of the facility; 10 4 4) financing agreements between the project
company and the lenders, public and private, to fund the project and pro-
vide debt service out of the proceeds of the sales agreements with the host
government and any other sales commitments; 10 5 and 5) a fuel contract
guaranteeing a supply of fuel to the facility to ensure that the facility can
operate and that the operating costs are more certain.10 6 A project may
also include an agreement with an operator/manager of the facility if the
sponsor does not perform those functions itself.10 7 The goal of this system
of contracts is to plan the project as certainly as possible in order to mini-
mize the risk that the project will not generate the cash flows necessary to
pay operating costs, service debt, and provide a return to the sponsors.10 8
A well-executed project financed transaction balances the competing inter-
ests and tolerances for risk of the many different parties involved. 10 9
In project financed transactions, the financial risks of costly, capital-
intensive infrastructure projects are distributed amongst numerous parties
with interests in a particular project. 110 As noted above, project finance
"requires a clearer delineation of risk than is the case with traditional pub-
102. See id.
103. See id. at 66. In order to secure the host government's obligations under the
sales contract with the project company, the central bank of the nation, owned by the
national government, may provide a limited payment guarantee to the lenders. See Hoff-
man, supra note 18, at 90.
104. See VirrER, supra note 95, at 23-24.
105. See Goodwillie et al., supra note 24, at 13.
106. See VINrER, supra note 95, at 24.
107. If the transaction is a "Build-Own-Transfer," or "BOT," model, there will be a
transfer agreement in which the project company agrees to allow the host government to
purchase the project after a period of years sufficient for the project revenues to pay back
the lenders and provide a return on the SPC's investment. See Smith, supra note 94, at
190.
108. Stuart Rauner, Project Finance: A Risk Spreading Approach to the Commercial
Financing of Economic Development, 24 HARv. Ir'L LJ. 145 (1983). Contracts allocate
the legal rights and obligations each party bears with respect to each other, and allocate
the variety of risks involved in the transaction. See ViN-ER, supra note 95, at 23; Rauner,
supra, passim.
109. Creating this type of complex contractual system takes a long time to negotiate
and carries high transaction costs:
With deals that frequently involve billions of dollars of capital, and protracted,
fiendishly complex negotiations, project finance provides premium fees to the
dozen-odd firms in the U.S. and England that dominate the market worldwide
.... In the $1.9 billion Hub River power project in Pakistan, which closed in
1995 after eight years of negotiations, total legal fees for all firms were 'clearly
more than $10 million.'
John E. Morris, A Rival to M&A? Project Finance Comes of Age as Developing Nations Turn
to the Private Sector for Major Infrastructure Development, Am. LAw., Apr. 1996, at 26.
110. See Rauner, supra note 108, at 145; Slattery, supra note 96, at 62.
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lic projects" ' ' because it involves so many different parties and involves
such large capital outlays. Risk must be identified, evaluated, and allocated
among the various parties because if the risk in a project is either unknown
or too great, lenders will not finance the project.' 12 The fundamental prin-
ciple for allocation is that "the participant that can best exercise control
over a risk or that will realize the greatest reward if the risk does not materi-
alize... [should be] allocated the risk."113 If there is too much risk relative
to the expected return on the project, the financing will not be forthcom-
ing, the project will not take place, and the projected service will not be
provided for the host nation. 1 4 Thus, failure to agree to a particular allo-
cation of the project's risks amongst the principal parties is often a cause
of the failure of project financed transactions in developing nations.115
A. Environmental Risk
Of the several different kinds of risks presented by international project
financed transactions,' 1 6 this Note is concerned with environmental
111. WoR.D DEV oPME r REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 94.
112. Due to the non-recourse nature of most project financed transactions, lenders
perform a great deal of due diligence before lending any funds. See Hoffman, supra note
18, at 190. The corporation and contractors that are parties to the transaction are con-
cerned because unexpected significant environmental costs can render transactions
unviable, particularly in a finely-tuned project finance deal that hinges on the long term
viability of the project for payback and profits. Risk, "unless subject to ascertainable
limits ... can render a project unbankable because lenders [or other parties] are not
likely to undertake unpredictable or unquantifiable liabilities." ViNrER, supra note 95, at
117.
113. Hoffman, supra note 18, at 194.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. The sum of the varieties of risk in project finance transactions has been called
the "project risk." Smith, supra note 94, at 192. Individually, there are three varieties of
risk.
1) Commercial Risk:
Commercial risks relate to potential problems during construction, such as
cost and schedule variations (completion risks); to problems in the operation
of the plant, such as might stem from faulty operation or poor performance
(operational risks); and to potential failures to generate cash flow or meet
demand (supply and market risks).
Id. at 196.
2) Political or Country Risk:
"Political or country risks are specific to the host country and may include
currency and foreign exchange risks, governmental default on contractual
obligations, expropriation [of the property or other rights of the project], and
civil turmoil." Id. Political risks may also arise "from actions or failures to
act by governments which are not in accordance with local and/or interna-
tional law."
GOODWILLIE, supra note 100, at 14.
3) Force Majeure Risk.
"Typically, force majeure events are defined as circumstances not within the
reasonable control of the party affected which prevents performance of such
party and which, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, such party is
unable to prevent, avoid or remove." Id. Examples are natural disasters such
as earthquakes, hurricanes or other acts of God.
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risk.117 Environmental risk is the probability that environmental liability
will result in the imposition of a cost upon one or more of the project's
principal participants. 1 8 Such a cost could occur if the project, whether
in its normal course of operation, because of abnormal operation, or as a
consequence of a catastrophic accident: (1) fails to adhere to a legally or
contractually imposed standard of environmental compliance (such as
standards for emissions, levels of site contamination or major hazards due
to an accident); (2) fails to maintain a level of productivity that ensures the
profits of the project; 119 or (3) fails to maintain a sufficient public good
will for the project, causing either diminished use or rejection of its serv-
ices (such as a boycott because of pollution by the facility) or demands for
its termination.120 Failure to comply with any of these normative stan-
dards, which can occur independently or in combination, jeopardizes the
project because the funds re-allocated to address the environmental issue
would otherwise be used to pay back the project financing and provide a
return on the owners' investment.
Environmental costs can make a transaction unbankable, particularly
in a finely-tuned project finance deal that hinges on the long term viability
of the project for payback and profits. 121 Therefore, the potential environ-
mental liability - the environmental risk - of a facility must be ascer-
tained prior to the development of the facility. A plant, for example, that
does not comply with existing or future environmental regulations in the
host nation may incur environmental liabilities that render its financing
impracticable, denying the host nation the service that a viable facility
would have provided.
Environmental risk can affect every project participant. 122 Therefore,
effective estimation and allocation of the potential environmental risk as
well as the known environmental costs in a project are necessary to deter-
mine whether the proposed facility will be economically viable. The next
Note that different types of risk will be of concern only at certain stages of the project
- for example, completion risks are only an issue during construction of the facility.
Given this, some commentators classify risks temporally, distinguishing design, engi-
neering and construction risks, start-up risks, and operating risks. See, e.g., Hoffman,
supra note 18, at 193.
117. The potential environmental costs and risks include: (1) losses to companies and
their financiers such as (a) civil and criminal liability; (b) plant closure, downtime for
retrofitting; (c) rejection or delay of contracts and permits; and (d) increased cost of
capital; and (2) risks to financial institutions such as (a) credit risk - delayed payment or
write-offs of loans; (b) position risk - devaluation of company's securities; (c) liquidity
risk - loss of market value in liquidation of collateral; (d) legal risk - civil and criminal
liability through exercise of control; and (e) funding risk - reduced access to capital
from international markets. BOND & CARTER, supra note 91, at 32.
118. See Vlmrra, supra note 95, at 219.
119. An example of such a failure would be if the project design was flawed or out-
dated so that both productivity and environmental protection are compromised, and
costly environment-protecting redesign or retrofitting are required.
120. Smith, supra note 94, at 195.
121. See VimER, supra note 95, at 219-20.
122. Eugene W. Goodwillie, Jr. & Troy Alexander, Project Finance, in NEw YORK AND
DELAwARE BusiNEss EurmnFs 222, 239 (Arthur Norman Field & Mortin Moskin eds.,
1997).
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section identifies and evaluates the variety of means that are employed to
allocate environmental risk,123 highlighting the shortcomings of each.
B. The Means of Allocating Environmental Risk Among the Parties to
Project Financed Transactions
The parties to project finance transactions treat environmental risks in
infrastructure projects like other risks: they assess them, mitigate them
where possible, and then allocate them amongst the various parties accord-
ing to who is best able to ensure that the risk is minimized. 124 There are a
variety of private and public legal means of allocating environmental risk;
each is detailed below, starting with the private legal means.
1. Allocation by Choosing the Project Entity
Choosing the legal form of the project sponsor (such as a corporation or
partnership) is an important part of allocating environmental risk.125
When several different parties are involved as sponsors, they must choose a
project entity as a vehicle with which to achieve the project's goals.126 In
123. In the following discussion of the various means, I assume that an appropriate
allocation of environmental risk would both put the responsibility for mitigating risk
under the control of the party best situated to mitigate it and would mitigate environ-
mental harms to a degree that is consistent with either the most stringent environmental
standards in the domestic legislation of the host nation or, where national laws are
silent, with minimum international standards ensuring healthfulness. My intention in
fashioning what is likely a more restrictive, "greener" allocation of environmental risk is
not to choke off economic growth in developing nations; rather it is to bring about a
more sustainable, healthful, and environmentally conscious development.
Ascher has documented the fact that projects with significant environmental impacts
often have lower than anticipated rates of return. WiLLIAm AsCHER, COPING wiTH TE
DISAPPOINTING RATEs OF REruRN ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS THAT AF7EcT7 niE ENVIRON-
MENT 1 (1992). He writes that:
Development projects with significant environmental impacts pose special chal-
lenges for developing countries and the international institutions that help
finance their development. Whether these projects directly exploit the natural
resource base (e.g., timber exploitation) or have an incidental impact (e.g., a
highway through a wilderness area), they are often accompanied by distinctive
problems that threaten their own overall viability. Even worse, the ex ante evalu-
ations of these "environmental impact" projects often ignore the costs, delays
and reduced benefits that result from these impacts. Thus, many such projects
are launched despite the fact that their returns to the overall economy are often
below the cost of capital and - in all too many cases - actually negative.
Id. (footnote omitted).
124. BOND & CARTER, supra note 91, at x, xii.
125. Most project financings are structured using either New York or English law.
This Note treats the forms available under the American law and not the English. For a
brief explanation of the choices of legal form for the project entities available under
English law, see ViNTER, supra note 95, at 8-15.
126. See id. at 8. Vinter states that:
[tihe choice of vehicle will be dictated by, inter alia, the following considera-
tions: (a) the extent to which the sponsors wish to be insulated from the risks
and liabilities inherent in the project (b) the extent to which the sponsors wish
to avoid moneys borrowed for the purpose of funding the project appearing on
their respective balance sheets . . . (c) the ease with which profits can be
extracted by the sponsors (d) tax efficiency ... (e) flexibility of management
Cornell International Law Journal
choosing a legal form, participants must remember that limiting the pro-
ject entity's liability for obligations incurred for contract performance, tor-
tious behavior, and regulatory noncompliance is important to the viability
of the project. Therefore, unless local law prevents it, 12 7 project owners
prefer the use of a limited liability form such as incorporation or a limited
liability company over a form of partnership or incorporation as a subsidi-
ary of a parent sponsor. 128 The former forecloses a potential claimant's
recourse to the larger corporations, or other owners of the project entity, in
the event that environmental costs are incurred by the project company.
The latter, however, requires the general partners (or the general partner in
a limited partnership) to assume joint and several liability for any harms
that result from negligent behavior of the project entity.129
Critics of limited liability forms in the project finance context point
out that those who "evaluate possible investment options ... are likely only
to consider the marginal costs and benefits associated with the investments
that they will be required to internalize."'130 In other words, the project
entity can ignore environmental costs associated with the project that do
not accrue to the project. This externalization by means of the limited lia-
bility form will not appropriately allocate environmental risk because the
party in control of the project's polluting, the sponsor or operator, will have
no incentive to limit the pollution as long as the project remains suffi-
ciently profitable. 13' Absent imposition of an internal cost, for example by
environmental liability, it simply makes no financial sense for the sponsor
to limit the project's harm to the environment.
The majority of the special purpose project companies are set up as
limited liability companies. 132 Because companies will seek to minimize
their liability and will tend to act in their economic self-interest, allocation
structure (f) the level of minority protection (g) the level of publicity of the vehi-
des affairs .. .[and] (h) ease of dissolution.
Id. at 8.
127. The legal forms available to the project sponsors for the project entity will
depend on the local law of the host country. Id. at 12.
128. See id. at 16. The rationale for using the limited liability form is similar to the
rationale for using a non-recourse structure: limiting the imposition of costs upon the
sponsors. Indeed, as we saw above in the discussion of non-recourse financing, limited
liability is appealing because sponsors can
limit their downside risk to the value of their equity investment in the project
and the scope of any applicable sponsor support obligation. [This means that]
they can undertake major capital intensive projects in high-risk environments
without running the risk that a single project failure will bankrupt the company.
Goodwillie & Alexander, supra note 122, at 225.
129. N.Y. Bus. Copu,. LAw, § 628 (1996); New York's limited liability law provides that
"a member of a limited liability company... is not liable for any... liabilities of the
limited liability company... whether arising in tort or contract." N.Y. LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY LAw, Art. VI, § 609 (1996). Domestically, at least in the parent-subsidiary
context, the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" threatens the limited-recourse
nature of project financings. See Hoffman, supranote 18, at 189-90 & n.19 (1989).
130. Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessonsfor Corporate Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 448 (1995).
131. See id.
132. Goodwillie et al., supra note 24, at 25.
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of environmental risk through the choice of the project entity is insufficient
to ensure that development of infrastructure is undertaken with adequate
protection of the environment of developing nations.' 33 Therefore, host
nations should enact national legislation that provides for liability of pro-
ject sponsors and major shareholders where there is gross undercapitaliza-
tion of the project entity which leaves environmental claimants unsatisfied
or where the sponsors or shareholders make management decisions that
foreseeably cause substantial environmental degradation. As the next sec-
tion shows, another type of private law means of allocation, the insurance
contract, is also inadequate to appropriately allocate environmental risk.
2. Allocation By Means of Insurance
Commercial insurance is another means of allocating and minimizing envi-
ronmental risk. Insurance allocates responsibility for any economic costs
resulting from environmental harms to the polluter, but minimizes the
risks of forcing the individual polluter or an entire class of businesses (for
example, plastic manufacturers) into bankruptcy.- 3 4 Insurance against
environmental damage is difficult to obtain. 135 Many countries, however,
have at least one carrier that offers at least limited pollution insurance cov-
erage. 136 In the United States, for example, one carrier offers a policy that
indemnifies the insured for liability for "environmental impairment"'13 7
133. It might be argued, however, that in the context of international project finance,
the unfairness of permitting the project entity to avoid liability for its wrongs may be
offset by the fact that, absent the limitation of liability, the transactions would not occur.
However, it is probable that imposing liability would not stop project financing, it would
simply alter the pricing of the transaction, increasing it marginally to account for this
added risk assumed by the sponsor.
134. One commentator has observed that:
Legislatures and courts would be - and have been in the past - much more
reluctant to place on polluters the full burden of the economic loss caused by
pollution if that could result in the polluter being forced into bankruptcy or out
of business, with undesirable indirect adverse effects on the supply of manufac-
tured goods, commodities, or energy, or employment, and on the economy gen-
erally. Insurance is a device that, while not taking the financial burden
completely away from the polluter, just makes it bearable by spreading it over a
large number of potential polluters and over time.
Werner Pfennigstorf, Insurance of Environmental Risks: Recent Developments, 1982 ABA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw SYMPOsiuM 57, 59 (1982).
135. See VINrER, supra note 95, at 209 n.1.
136. The limited number of carriers of such insurance bears out the observation that
insuring environmental risk is itself very risky because "[m]any claims involving the
environment represent a new kind of risk whose nature and dimensions are not yet fully
known, which has a tendency to cause harm surreptitiously over long periods of time
and which is therefore extremely difficult to manage and to calculate." INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR INSURANCE LAw, POLLUTION INSURANCE: INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CoV-
ERAGES AND ExcLusiONs 2 (Werner Pfennigstorf ed., 1993) [hereinafter POLLUTION
INSURANCE].
137. In the agreement, the term environmental impairment means, in part: "damage
to the environment caused by: (1) the emission, discharge, disposal, dispersal, release,
seepage, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids
or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants, into or upon
land, the atmosphere or any other watercourse or body of water..." Id. at 224.
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that is "gradual and fortuitous and neither expected nor intended by the
insured."138 This coverage is available only if the claim establishing liabil-
ity arises from "environmental impairments" in the United States, its terri-
tories or Canada, or, alternatively, if the suit is brought in the United
States, its territories or Canada.139 Moreover, the scope of this insurance is
further limited to harms that do not occur as a matter of course and that
are not "sudden and accidental."140 Additionally, because the policy's cov-
erage is limited to liability arising from judgments in the United States or
Canada, the project agreements must include a choice of law clause sub-
jecting the parties to American law. However, a host sovereign might not
wish to make such a concession.
Currently, no public sector entity provides insurance for environmen-
tal risk, although other risks accompanying foreign investment in develop-
ing nations are publicly insurable. The creation of the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1988 is evidence of a widespread
international recognition of the necessity for the public to shoulder certain
risks that would otherwise fall upon private entities. MIGA provides insur-
ance coverage for some of the risks arising from international investment
in developing nations.1 41 MIGA insurance, however, does not cover envi-
ronmental risk. The risks covered by MIGA include "measures attributable
to the host government such as nationalization, confiscation, sequestra-
tion, seizure, attachment, and freezing of assets."1 42 However, no similar
MIGA coverage exists for "[m]easures normally taken by governments to
regulate their economic activities such as taxation, environmental and
labor legislation .... "143 The insurance coverage of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation is similarly limited to "political risks" such as
"Currency Inconvertibility . . . Expropriation . . . [and] Political
Violence." 44
Some sound logic underlies the unavailability of coverage for environ-
mental risk. One reason is the uncertainty of the extent of the potential
environmental damage that can be caused by such major infrastructure
and industrial projects. Where risks are unknowable and potentially very
large, insurers will not provide coverage. 145 The uncertainty surrounding
the potential costs of providing coverage for environmental risk means that
private insurance providers will likely never provide extensive coverage for
environmental harms. 146 Thus, it is unlikely that publicly available insur-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 225.
140. Id.
141. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, opened
for signature Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598 (entered into force April 12, 1988).
142. Commentary on the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, 1 ICSID Rev. FOREIGN INv. UJ. 195, cl 14 (1986).
143. Id.
144. OvERsEAs PRIVAT-E INvES-MEN CovaoarmoN, supra note 94, at 7.
145. Kathryn E.B. Robb, Environmental Considerations in Project Financing, 672 PLI/
Comm 565, 593 (1993).
146. This will continue at least until the passage of time permits an empirical basis
for determining the scale of the environmental risk involved in project financing of infra-
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ance for environmental risk will play a large role in allocating that risk.
Another shortcoming of insurance, when it is available, as an alloca-
tive means is that its coverage unavoidably has gaps. These gaps include:
the lack of an identifiable polluter; no liability because there is no existing
environmental regulation or because a determination of a rule violation
has not been made to trigger the policy; the incident is beyond the scope of
the policy's coverage; the amount of the policy's coverage is insufficient to
remedy the harm; or the insurer is insolvent.147 One other major problem
with insurance from the standpoint of environmental protection is that it is
curative and not preventive, and it is curative only to the extent that a com-
plex environmental problem may in fact be cured.148 When an insurance
claim is filed, the underlying environmental harm has already occurred.
Therefore, insurance is not preferable to a means of allocation, such as
effective environmental regulation, that prevents or deters the occurrence
of the environmental harm in the first place.
3. Allocation by Agreement Between the Parties
Contractual agreement is another primary means by which the parties allo-
cate environmental risk because agreements may assign responsibility
among the parties for compliance with particular environmental standards
and for the costs of any failure to comply with those standards. As noted
above, project financed transactions are based on a complex framework of
contracts that carefully define the respective rights and obligations of the
various parties to the transaction. The negotiation of these contracts is a
process of "risk spreading" whereby sponsors, lenders, sellers of inputs to
the project, users of the project's output, and government agencies become
contractually bound to accept certain environmental (as well as other)
risks.149 For example, the credit agreement between the private commer-
cial lenders and the project entity often will include as a condition prece-
dent to financial closing the promise that the project's operation complies
with specified criteria that mitigate the project's potential to incur environ-
mental liability.150
For at least two reasons, lenders are motivated to require the policing
of projects they fund for compliance with environmental standards. First, a
bank may not receive its return if environmental risk is not identified and
allocated effectively. The cash flows out of which the project's debt is ser-
viced may be impaired or negated by environmental clean-up costs, expen-
structure. Because of the actuarial uncertainty about environmental harms and because
insurers have found it difficult to develop clear definitions for the scope of their policy
coverage, insurers have sought to limit the coverage provided to polluters. See POLLUTION
INSURANCE, supra note 136, at 68.
147. Id. at 75.
148. Worse still, having an insurance policy, whether issued by a public or a private
underwriter, may create a moral hazard by discouraging a potential polluter from
preventing pollution from occurring. See PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 17, at 133 & fig.
2.4.
149. Rauner, supra note 108, at 161, 166-67.
150. Goodwillie & Alexander, supra note 122, at 240.
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sive retro-fitting of the facility, or a shutdown in the event of a serious
accident 5 1 Second, environmental contamination or other environmen-
tal liability will jeopardize the lender's security interest in the project facil-
ity, which because of the limited-recourse nature of the financing, is the
major part of the lender's security.15 2 Further, conditions in the credit
agreement will often specify that the established environmental standards
of a particular nation or organization are met by the project.15 3 For exam-
ple, the credit agreement might require that the lender comply with the
environmental laws of the United States or, more commonly, the environ-
mental guidelines of the World Bank or another international finance
agency.15 4 Other conditions in the credit agreement may make initial
financing and subsequent disbursements contingent upon the project com-
pany's obtaining an ongoing compliance with the necessary environmental
permits and other documentation.1 55
In addition to contracts between the private parties involved in the
transaction, there are typically contractual agreements between the host
sovereign and the project entity that allocate environmental risk between
those parties. The concession agreement is the primary agreement
between the sovereign and the project entity.15 6 This agreement defines
the project's scope and establishes the project entity's rights and obliga-
tions with respect to the host government, including the range of national
environmental legislation and regulations that govern the project.' 5 7
151. Id. at 239.
152. Id.
153. E. Waide Warner, Jr. & Emily Altman, Credit Agreements and Collateral Agree-
ments in International Infrastructure Projects, 734 PLI/Comm 233, 240 (1996).
154. GOODWILLIE, supra note 100, at 11-12.
155. Warner & Altman, supra note 153, at 238; Goodwillie & Alexander, supra note
122, at 240. Another example is the land conveyance agreement which is a type of
contract usually used in projects involving a transfer to the project entity of the land on
which the project is sited. Smith, supra note 94, at 227. The agreement usually makes a
sale or a long-term lease of the land to the project entity. Id. Its terms allocate the
"[riesponsibflities for existing and future conditions at the site (suitability of soil condi-
tions, environmental contamination, etc.)" and specify the "governing laws, regulations,
and methods of dispute resolution." Id. Similarly, the sponsors and the operator/man-
ager may enter into an agreement allocating some or all of the liability for environmental
harms to the operator/manager because it is best situated to prevent the environmental
harm from materializing.
156. Christopher J. Sozzi, Comment, Project Finance and Facilitating Telecommunica-
tions Infrastructure Development in Newly-Industrializing Countries, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 435, 471 (1996).
157. Id. However, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity is sometimes invoked
by a sovereign in order to excuse its breach of a contract, a means of protecting the
reliance of the project sponsors and lenders is needed. Viktor Soloveytchik, New Perspec-
tives for Concession Agreements, 16 Hous. J. INr'L L. 261, 266 (1993). The stabilization
clause is such a device. A stabilization clause is a term in an agreement between the
project entity and the host sovereign which commits the host to apply consistently to the
project the specific fiscal and regulatory requirements that were originally negotiated in
that agreement. Id. While the consensus is that such clauses do not supersede the
sovereign's right to terminate or modify a contract to which it is a party, some commen-
tators argue for a more binding power to stabilization clauses. Thomas W. Waelde &
George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus
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Contractual agreements between the various parties internalize the
environmental costs of the project and therefore can provide significant
allocation and mitigation of environmental risk in project finance transac-
tions. Contractual agreements assign responsibility for compliance with
any applicable environmental standards and for assumption of the costs of
any failure to comply with those standards. As a result of the parties' (par-
ticularly the lenders') due diligence process and of periodic, independent
environmental auditing carried out in the course of the operation of the
project, the project's network of contracts is a privately created framework
into which provisions are incorporated directly to manage the environmen-
tal costs of the project and to assign the risk associated with those actual or
potential costs. 15 8 This cost management is inherent in project finance
because, as noted above, risk and cost identification and their allocation is
central to the method of financing. The combination of a liability-imposed
risk of environmental cost, combined with the cost-management function
of project finance, bring the sophisticated professional expertise of law-
yers, financiers, environmental and engineering experts to bear on the pro-
ject facility's compliance with the environmental strictures imposed by the
contractual framework. 159 As a result, there can be significant environ-
mental protections conferred upon the developing nation by a transaction
which is project financed rather than developed with more traditional debt-
Contract Interpretation, 31 Tax. INT' LJ. 215, 230 (1996). The risk of the host sovereign
claiming sovereign immunity and breaching the agreement would be mitigated by such a
clause which would be enforced in the event of a contractual dispute. See Sozzi, supra
note 156, at 463. Such a clause, if effective, would protect the project entity from any
changes in environmental law or regulation. Such a clause would also protect the pro-
ject entity from the host's more vigorous enforcement of those rules that might result
after the conclusion of the project agreements and the commitment of resources by the
project company when the bargaining power shifts in favor of the host sovereign. While
this type of stabilization may be favorable to the project company, in a rapidly changing
legal environment, the better approach is probably to leave the host sovereign with
unlimited regulatory options. Doing so would let the market regulate decisions to
breach or modify by channeling capital away from those countries that abuse the sover-
eign power to dishonor contracts to the detriment of foreign project investors.
Another public-private contractual device which allocates environmental risk is a sov-
ereign guarantee. The sovereign guarantee is an agreement that the host government will
provide "compensation if future changes in government policy affect [the project's] via-
bility." BOND & CARTER, supra note 91, at 3. See also WoaRD DEVELOPMENT REPoRT 1994,
supra note 2, at 94 ("The continuing role of government lies in insuring the private
investor against policy-induced risks."). These guarantees include assurance of compen-
sation for events which would affect the regulatory posture of the host nation with
respect to the degree and character of environmental compliance required of the project.
See Smith, supra note 94, at 222.
158. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
159. See Goodwillie & Alexander, supra note 122, at 240. To mitigate environmental
risk, Goodwillie and Alexander advise that:
[alt the planning stage [of the project], the parties should engage independent
technical consultants to evaluate the environmental liabilities associated with
the project, its location and its production materials and waste and with any pre-
existing hazards on the site. Through advice of counsel, the parties should
become familiar with the environmental laws of the host country... and assure
that such laws are taken into account in the feasibility study phase.
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financing. 160
On paper, contractual allocation would appear to appropriately allo-
cate environmental risk, but, in practice, a contractual framework alone is
not enough to allocate the environmental risk of a developing nation effec-
tively. First, developing countries rarely contract for provisions concerning
environmental regulation. Many developing countries, as parties to sover-
eign guarantees or to concession agreements, lack sufficient legal and envi-
ronmental expertise to incorporate the appropriate terms into their
agreements. In those agreements between parties that do have the legal
and environmental expertise (as between lenders and the project entity),
the mechanisms for enforcing the terms are not in place. The host nation
must both have the leverage to bargain for effective contractual provi-
sions 161 and have effective national environmental legislation, regulation,
and enforcement if contractual conditions are to effectively allocate respon-
sibility for any harm to the environment. Second, the terms in the contract
must be enforced if they are to be effective. The covenants in a financing
agreement run between the lender and the project entity and the project
entity is typically required to police itself to remain in compliance. 162 Self-
policing has proven ineffective with respect to environmental compliance,
particularly where no other environmental policing occurs. 163 Third, con-
tractual allocation, even when effective, does not cover any of the transac-
tions funded publicly, which, as noted above, are the vast majority of
infrastructure projects undertaken in the developing world. 164
Id.
160. The inclusion of explicit environmental standards in a project contract is an
effective means of mitigating and allocating environmental risk and is often the most
effective means of doing so if the host nation does not have developed or efficient envi-
ronmental regulations and enforcement mechanisms. For example,
[a] wastewater treatment contract in Mexico financed by IFC contains explicit
contractual obligations for both the operator and the supplying utility... As
before (when the local municipality treated waste water) government inspectors
periodically check that the relevant national and local regulations are being
enforced. However, the contract gives financial incentives for both the private
operator and the municipal water authority to monitor standards continuously,
because they determine payments made under the contract.
BOND & CARTER, supra note 91, at 34.
161. There is a dearth of technical and legal expertise in many developing nations
which hampers the development of effective environmental rulemaking, whether at the
individual contractual level or at the level of legislation. THE UNITED NATIONS CONFER.
ENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL AGREEMENTS - A SURVEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 24 (Peter H. Sand ed.,
1992) [hereinafter U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT].
162. BRAiE, supra note 67, at 42.
163. See id.
164. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13. Where a project is under-
taken publicly, the only chance of appropriate allocation of environmental risk is if the
nation has a functional system of environmental enforcement which also applies to the
conduct of the sovereign. Otherwise, the public nature of the project will do nothing to
benefit the environment and those who depend on it for their health and/or livelihood.
See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1996) (requir-
ing all federal agencies to consider the likely environmental effects of their activities).
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If the choice of project entity and the agreement between the parties
do not appropriately allocate environmental risk, perhaps it is because
those mechanisms operate at the level of the individual transaction. A bet-
ter means of allocating that risk is for an institution to set up rules that are
applicable generally to all the transactions with which it is involved. In
fact, because almost all project finance transactions utilize some sort of
multilateral development bank (MDB) financing, the MDBs are in a posi-
tion to, in effect, legislate rules allocating environmental risk. They have
done so typically by requiring an environmental impact assessment (EIA)
which effectively conditions their financing or loan guarantees upon assur-
ances and projections that a project's design employs sufficiently clean
technologies and is not sited anywhere that will have a tremendous envi-
ronmental impact. The next question is whether the MDBs' rules are suffi-
cient to render an appropriate allocation of environmental risk.
4. Allocation by Means of the Environmental Assessment Criteria of an
International Finance Institution or a National Export Agency
Most project-financed transactions involve as a lender or as a guarantor of
financing, or both, at least one international finance and development
organization, such as the World Bank's subsidiary, the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), or a national export finance institution such as
the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank).165 In the past
decade, these public lenders have been under pressure to incorporate envi-
ronmental assessment criteria into their project review procedures. 166 This
pressure has come from environmental interest groups both in the devel-
oped nations and in the developing nations which host the projects. 167 As
a result of these pressures, each institution has either adopted or co-opted a
165. See Mark Kantor, Summary of Project Financing Programs of: U.S. Eximbank,
OPIC, JEXIM, ECGD, 707 PLI/Comm 111 (1995) (describing the project financing-
related services offered by these institutions); Thomas N. Kerr, What's Good for General
Motors is Not Always Good for Developing Countries, 29 l. r'i LAw. 153, 154, 164-65
(1995); Rauner, supra note 108, at 157. For convenience, I will henceforth refer to these
finance entities as "public lenders."
166. See Kerr, supra note 165, at 164. In fact, in 1996, Eximbank decided that it
could not provide any financing to the Three Gorges Dam project participants because
the project as presented to the bank did not meet the bank's environmental assessment
guidelines, adopted in February, 1995. However, the bank did leave open the possibility
that, upon a showing of further data, it could change its decision. See John H.
Cushman, Jr., Ex-Im Bank Refuses Loan Backing for Big China Dam, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1996, at D1.
167. Generally, this adoption was prompted by political pressure that was the result
of a number of cases where particular projects supported by public lenders had or could
have had a severe detrimental effect on the environment. For example, in the United
States, Eximbank felt intense political pressure to adopt formal environmental impact
assessment criteria after it approved loan guarantees to fund the completion of a Soviet-
designed nuclear reactor in Czechoslovakia shortly after the Cherynobyl disaster.
Thomas W. Lippman, Loan Guarantee Given for Czech Nuclear Plant; Westinghouse to
Finish Soviet-Design Reactor, WASH. Posy, Mar. 11, 1994, at A20. Hearings on the
"United States Export Import Bank and the Environment" before the House Subcommit-
tee on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy closely followed
the grant of loan guarantees by Eximbank to Westinghouse, the contractor on the Czech
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set procedures to evaluate the environmental impact of the projects they
support.168 The assessment procedures of public lenders typically allocate
environmental risk by imposing performance standards for the life of the
project. These standards are designed to minimize the environmental
impact of the project and to impose any environmental costs upon the pro-
ject entity.16 9 To comply with the public lender's performance require-
ments, the project must be designed to internalize as much of its own
potential environmental costs as is technologically feasible. 170
To effectively regulate the environmental impact of projects they
finance, public lenders apply extensive environmental assessment proce-
dures to all projects seeking financing. 171 The Asian Development Bank's
(ADB) procedures are typical of these environmental assessment proce-
dures. Initially, the ADB's procedures require the Bank's project staff to
categorize the project into one of three categories (A, B, and C) depending
on the project's inherent tendency to pollute. 172 If the project is assigned
to a category that will have substantial environmental impact (A or B), the
Bank completes an initial environmental examination (IEE), and then an
environmental impact assessment (EIA) if the IEE suggests the environ-
job. Eximbank promulgated new environmental guidelines in 1995. See Kerr, supra
note 165, at 154.
168. Kerr, supra note 165, at 164-69. As an example of co-option, the International
Finance Corporation has adopted the World Bank's environmental assessment guide-
lines as part of its environmental assessment procedures. INrNuATIONAL FINANCE COR-
PoRArloN, IFC AND THE ENVIRONMENT - ANNUAL REVIEW 1992, at 7 (1992). Typically,
[t]he environmental review process involves consideration of the following, as
appropriate: Assessment of the baseline environmental situation[;] Sustainable
use of natural resources[;] Pollution controls (liquid effluents and air emissions)
and solid and chemical waste management[;] Protection of human health, cul-
tural properties, endangered species, and sensitive ecosystems[;] Use of danger-
ous substances[;] Major hazard assessment[;] Occupational health and safety[;]
Fire and life safety[;] Resettlement issues[;] Socioeconomic concerns.
Id.
169. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT SOURCEBOOK 1-3 (1991) (pro-
viding waste level limits for over fifty industries).
170. See THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AsSESSMENT xviii & n.4 (1997) [hereinafter IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT]; AsAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AsSESSMENT: DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AsSESSMENT 9-12 (1991) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
AsSEsSMENT].
171. Kerr, supra note 165, at 154.
172. AsIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL REVIEW PROCEDURES OF THE AsIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 3 (1993). The three
categories are as follows:
Category A: Projects with significant adverse environmental impact as predicted
by the IEE [environmental examination]; an EIA [environmental impact assess-
ment] is required. Category B: Projects with adverse environmental impact but
which are of lesser degree and/or significance than category A impact; although
an EIA may not be required, an IEE is required for these projects. Category C:
Projects unlikely to have adverse environmental impact; no EIA or IEE is nor-
mally required.
Id. at 3. The World Bank, which initially categorizes projects in a similar fashion as the
Asian Development Bank, provides lists of which types of projects typically fall into each
category. Operational Directive 4.00, Annex A3, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 37.
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mental impact will be of a sufficiently serious nature.17 3 The latter docu-
ment includes the following sections: a general description of the project; a
description of the environment in which the project is to take place; the
anticipated environmental impacts of the project and mitigation measures
that will be taken by the project company; several alternatives to the project
as planned and the relative environmental impact of those alternatives; a
cost benefit analysis of the project; the institutional requirements and envi-
ronmental monitoring requirements for ongoing compliance; a representa-
tion of the steps taken to secure significant public involvement in the
assessment process; and a section for the conclusions of the EIA report.174
Public lender assessment criteria regulate the project's impact upon
the host nation's environment by requiring the project entity to mitigate
potential environmental harms. In nations that lack an effective regulatory
mechanism, public lender environmental assessment criteria are often the
main or only form of environmental regulation of project financed infra-
structure facilities. 175
While these criteria impose a minimum level of concern for the envi-
ronmental impact of a funded project, public lender regulatory mecha-
nisms are insufficient on their own to effectively regulate the
environmental impact of project financed infrastructure development.
First, public lenders' regulatory authority reaches only those projects that
are funded by the lender; they cannot regulate foreign investment projects
that do not involve a public lender, nor can they reach public or private
domestic projects which typically do not involve such a lender. As noted
above, these latter two categories account for the vast majority of infra-
structure projects. 176 While private forefgn funds are increasing as a per-
centage of total infrastructure investment in developing countries, public
domestic funds still make up over ninety percent of total infrastructure
investment.1 77 Second, public lenders' assessment guidelines are not
enforceable in the international legal system so that there is no legal
accountability to deter breaches of those guidelines, nor any available legal
redress based on the guidelines if breaches lead to harms.' 78 Third, the
development of domestic and global capital markets sparked by the
173. AsAu' DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 172, at 1.
174. Id. at 31-37.
175. This surrogate function is illustrated by the International Finance Corporation's
use of "the more stringent of the host country's requirements or World Bank policies
and guidelines." IrnTERN-A-noN~AL FINANCE COuORATiON, supra note 168, at 6.
176. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
177. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 89-90.
Developing countries now spend around $200 billion a year on infrastructure
investment, some 90 percent or more of it derived from government tax reve-
nues or intermediated by governments ... Infrastructure's share of total govern-
ment investment is rarely less than 30 percent and sometimes as much as 70
percent... In addition, maintenance and operating expenditures command a
high share of current expenditures.
Id.
178. This is because MDBs do not have formal legal standing before international
courts. Guyett, supra note 69, at 895.
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increased flow of private investment for infrastructure in developing
nations decreases the number of projects that involve public lenders. 179
Therefore, public lenders' environmental assessment criteria regulates an
increasingly smaller percentage of infrastructure projects in developing
nations. 180 Additionally, public lenders' environmental impact assessment
is often carried out by the resource-strapped host nations themselves.' 8 '
One of the implications of this is that a relatively technically unsophistica-
ted nation is responsible for making a very sophisticated technical evalua-
tion, a situation which may well result in a faulty evaluation. Also, MDB
environmental impact assessment typically requires monitoring for ongo-
ing compliance during the construction and operation of the facility.
Thus, the host nation must have a developed regulatory mechanism in
place to enforce effectively the MDB environmental assessment
guidelines. 182
For these reasons, MDB assessment guidelines do not provide suffi-
cient allocation of environmental risk. Therefore, they cannot sufficiently
prevent environmental harms from occurring, nor can they ensure that the
costs of those occurrences are accounted for by the polluter. While these
quasi-legislative rulemakers cannot provide developing nations with suffi-
cient environmental protection from the environmental consequences of
infrastructure development, perhaps actual legislatures could so provide.
The next two sections look at the potential for allocation of environmental
risk by means of public law: international and national.
5. Allocation by Means of International Law
Since the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the international community, as
represented by the United Nations, has demonstrated a commitment to
protecting the natural environment.' 83 In the period between Stockholm
and the present, over 160 multilateral treaties and protocols on the environ-
ment have been promulgated.' 84 Despite this multitude of agreements,
they have been largely ineffective because few of them contain substantive
commitments by the parties and the agreements generally lack monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms.
179. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 104.
180. Goodwillie & Alexander, supra note 122, at 239.
181. Charles E. Di Leva, The World Bank And Environmental Law: A Post Rio Summary
of Activities, C883 ALI-ABA 525, 529 (1994). While MDBs have some policing mecha-
nisms, they are limited and should not be considered a substitute for national policing.
This limitation is evident in the tremendous local regulatory and administrative capac-
ity-building efforts of these MDBs which indicate that their policing capacity is not a
sufficient substitute for national monitoring. See id. at 525.
182. BRAEEs, supra note 67, at 42.
183. REPORT OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HuMAN ENVIRONMENT, STOCKHOLM DEC-
LARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, 27th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (1972).
184. See U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, REGISTER OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND
OTHER AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC15/INF4
(1993).
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International rulemaking and non-binding international agreements
on regulating the global environment are playing a greater role in the allo-
cation of environmental risk in international project finance transac-
tions.185 Even though there are as yet no globally binding international
legal rules on the environment, 186 recent international agreements are
pregnant with implications for the future of environmental regulation at
the regional and global level.' 8 7 While developing nations tend to embrace
international environmental legal norms reluctantly, if at all,' 88 recent
international initiatives in the areas of air quality, water quality, manage-
ment of waste, management of hazardous products, and protection of flora
and fauna will affect the conduct of project companies engaged in the con-
struction and operation of infrastructure and industrial facilities in devel-
oping nations in the years to come.' 89
The 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED) held in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil sought to establish a new
world consensus on the relationship between development and the envi-
ronment.190 The dominant feature of this consensus is its guiding princi-
ple, embracing "sustainable development" and the ideal of a "marriage of
environment and development."' 91 The specific conventions and the sev-
eral agreements concluded at UNCED serve, respectively, as binding legal
rules and as the framework for the development of future binding legal
rules at the national level.192 These legal rules, instead of reflecting the
traditional paradigm of mutual exclusivity of development and environ-
mental protection,193 demand that development occur only with due
185. Id. at xi. "In the period [since] 1940... over one hundred international agree-
ments and legal instruments regulating the environment have been made law." Mary Pat
Williams Silveira, The Rio Process: Marriage of Environment and Development, in SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INmRNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (Winifred Lang ed., 1995).
186. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION, UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw - EMERGING TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS 1 (1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw].
187. Id. at 2. Additionally, there has been a proliferation of bilateral, multilateral and
regional treaties binding two or more signatories to legal norms designed to protect the
environment. NANDA, supra note 26, at 7.
188. Silveira, supra note 185, at 11.
189. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LxAW, supra note 186, at 3-9.
190. See Rio Declaration, supra note 81, at 876.
191. Silveira, supra note 185, at 10.
192. Two items of international law were opened for signature at (UNCED): a Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change which is aimed at stabilizing global emissions of
greenhouse gas, and a Biodiversity Treaty aimed at protecting endangered species. The
non-binding agreements concluded were the Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment, the Statement of Forest Principles, and Agenda 21. Rio Declaration, supra note
81, princ. 7; Statement of Forest Principles, UNCED Doc. A/Conf.151/6/Rev.1, 13 June
1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992); United Nations Conference on the Environment
and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add.1 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Agenda 21].
193. The traditional view, prevalent today particularly in developing nations, holds
that "[elconomic growth [should] overshadow [concerns about the environment,] fol-
lowing the example of the industrialized countries that began to tackle their environ-
mental problems only after achieving major economic objectives." ISMAEL SERAGELDIN ET
AL., THE WORLD BANK, MAKING DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE 13 (1994).
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accounting for its effects on the global environment. 194 These new and
developing international rules typically allocate the environmental risk of
infrastructure development to the project company. Then, the project com-
pany, for example, passes along any additional costs to the public in the
pricing of the service it provides. 195
There are at least two major obstacles to the formation of a globally
binding regime of international environmental law that effectively allocates
environmental risk. First, strong forces of sovereignty and self-determina-
tion pull developing nations away from integration with an international
order. 19 6 This means that many international agreements are not ratified
by individual developing nations and thus are not binding upon them. 19 7
As noted above, many developing nations are skeptical about whether rati-
fication would bind them to a new world order that best serves their inter-
est in efficiently developing their economies. 198 The threat of additional
costs, added to the already tremendous costs of developing an infrastruc-
ture and industry, has caused many developing nations to perceive the sus-
tainable development model as an impediment to economic growth. 19 9
Consequently, they have not incorporated sustainability into their environ-
mental management planning.20 0 Furthermore, Principle 23 of the 1972
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment articulates the need to
consider "the system of values prevailing in each country, and the extent to
which the applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced
194. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND REGULATIONS 251 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1996) ("[P]olicy makers internationally are
considering the use of prior compensatory remedies to persuade industry to act more
responsibly and to shoulder the full cost of its environmental impact.").
195. The "polluter-pays principle" is an integral element of the new environmental
consensus. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 186, at 25. The principle
ensures that "natural or legal persons governed by public or private law who are respon-
sible for pollution must pay the costs of such measures as are necessary to eliminate that
pollution or to reduce it so as to comply with the standard or equivalent measures." Id.
The European Economic Community (EEC) recommends that member states apply the
principle in their national environmental legislation and has also incorporated the prin-
ciple into the 1987 Amendments to the Treaty of Rome. Id.
196. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECU-
nvE DIRECTOR - TWENTY YEARS SINCE STOCKHOLM 1 (1992) [hereinafter TWENTY YEARS];
NANDA, supra note 26, at 10-11.
197. NANDA, supra note 26, at 10-11; FREDERIC L. KIRGISJR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETr ING 280 (2d ed. 1993).
198. See Developments in the Law - International Environmental Law, IV, Assent to and
Enforcement of International Environmental Agreements, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1550, 1550-51
(1991) ("states may underestimate environmental problems and conclude that negotiat-
ing or assenting to agreements is too costly.").
199. NANDA, supra note 26, at 10-11.
200. A related idea is held by many decision makers in developing nations. Since the
"right" to externalize the costs of pollution is a form of entitlement that was used by the
now-developed nations, these decision makers in the developing nations believe that
now that "right" should be available to them to "subsidize" their development. This
perceived inequity has given rise to the concept, included in the Rio Declaration in 1992,
that "in view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States
have common but differentiated responsibilities." Rio Declaration, supra note 81, princ.
7.
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countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the
developing countries."20 1 This principle is the basis for the conclusion
that developed nations have a responsibility to share in any additional
costs incurred by developing nations if they choose to develop their infra-
structure, industry, and natural resources sustainably, rather than in a
manner which is cheaper because it externalizes some or all environmental
costs. However, these nations instead opt for exploitation of natural
resources in accordance with the traditional development model and their
sovereign right to exploit resources within their national boundaries or
under their control.20 2 Further, because international agreements must be
ratified by individual nations in order to become binding upon those
nations, there is nothing to compel these nations to join the new interna-
tional environmental order.203
Second, even when these nations wish to participate in an interna-
tional agreement effectively allocating environmental risk, they often lack
sufficient legal, technical, and administrative capacity to effectively imple-
ment and enforce such international environmental regimes.204 The inter-
201. Developed nations have set up several multilateral funds to pay the difference in
cost between the less and more environment-friendly technologies. The Global Environ-
ment Fund (GEF) is a good example:
[t]he GEF provides funding only for the 'agreed incremental costs for achieving
agreed global environmental benefits.' This means that financing will be
devoted only to those activities that benefit the global, as opposed to local, envi-
ronment, and will only fund the costs of actions which, because benefits accrue
globally and not locally, recipient countries would not undertake in their own
interest.
Proposed Operations and Structure of a Permanent Global Environment Facility: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of
the Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs - House of Representatives, 103d
Cong., Serial No. 103-60, 35 (1995) (Statement by Susan Levine, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for International Development, Debt and Environment Policy, Treasury
Department).
202. This right has consistently been acknowledged in international legal instru-
ments and by legal scholars.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment begins,
'States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the prin-
ciples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies.' The Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development repeats this statement in Principle 2, and adds 'and
developmental' to [environmental policies]. The Stockholm principle has been
commonly regarded as reflecting customary international law, and hence bind-
ing on all states.
Edith Brown Weiss, Environmental Equity: The Imperative for the Twenty-First Century, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAI LAW, 18, n.3 (Winifred Lang ed., 1994).
203. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SrUDIES, supra note 192, at xxvi ("The prolifera-
tion of international regulations on various aspects of the environment has not always
been reflected in national ratification."). There are, however, pressures that can be
brought to bear on recalcitrant nations, such as political pressure or economic pres-
sures, such as trade sanctions or limitations on foreign aid.
204. U.N. CoNFERENcE ON ENVIRONMENT, supra note 161, at 24. In this survey of the
implementation of international law in individual nations, the editor, a leading commen-
tator in the field of international environmental law, observes that:
While there is a continuous need for law improvement in all countries, many
developing countries have been affected by shortcomings of laws and regula-
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national community also lacks a mechanism to effectively enforce these
international agreements. 20 5 Therefore, absent effective national legal and
administrative systems, international legal norms do not have a real effect
in individual developing nations.20
6
Environmental management is a local, decentralized form of regula-
tion because it addresses the physical conditions in, or emanating from,
particular locations.20 7 Despite the ascendancy of international environ-
mental law, it is insufficient to regulate the environment of developing
nations without well-developed national legislation, regulation and enforce-
ment. Thus, effective national laws and law enforcement are needed. In
fact, absent effective national environmental regulation through both inter-
national law and contractual agreement, multilateral development institu-
tional criteria will not effectively allocate the environmental risk and costs
to the environment caused by the development of infrastructure and indus-
try. National regulation is not only the most valuable means of allocating
environmental risk but is necessary to the effectiveness of the other means
tions. To effectively integrate environment and development in the policies and
practices of each country, it is essential to develop and implement integrated,
enforceable, effective laws and regulations .... It is equally critical to develop
workable programmes to review and enforce compliance with the laws, regula-
tions, and standards that are adopted. Technical support may be needed for
many countries to accomplish these goals. Technical cooperation requirements
in this field include legal information, advisory services, and specialized train-
ing and institutional capacity-building.
Id. Jutta Brunee, Environmental Security in the Twenty-First Century: New Momentum for
the Development of International Environmental Law?, 18 FoRnDHA Ir'L LJ. 1742, 1745
(1995); Silveira, supra note 185, at 11 ("The lack of appropriate institutional and organi-
zational capacity [in developing nations] may pose formidable obstacles [to implemen-
tation of international legal norms].").
205. David Ardia has pointed out that "[tihe lack of a 'centralized supranational regu-
latory authority' has been cited as the critical barrier to effective environmental protec-
tion." Ardia, supra note 16, at 544 & n.237 (quoting Developments in the Law -
International Environmental Law, V, Institutional Arrangements, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1580,
1590 (1991)).
206. See Developments in the Law, supra note 198, at 1487, 1609 ("The body of cus-
tomary norms and international agreements that comprise the public international legal
system do not provide comprehensive environmental protection."); Sanford E. Gaines,
Global and Regional Perspectives on International Environmental Protection, 19 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 983, 997-98 (1997) cited in Ardia, supra note 16, at 509 n.58. ("With weak
international administrative capacity, the effectiveness of the regime depends on the
capacity of each of the participating governments to implement and enforce the appro-
priate domestic measures to give effect to the agreement.")
207. See BRasws, supra note 67, at 54; Cairncross, supra note 31, at 40 (concluding
that "[u]ltimately, local environmental problems that harm health or economic produc-
tivity will be solved by local pressures."). However, many scholars argue that the salient
characteristic of environmental problems is that they are not local. See, e.g., Ardia, supra
note 16, at 501 n.20 (identifying the following two lines of argument: 1) environmental
issues are not local because of the "interconnectedness of the biosphere;" and 2) envi-
ronmental issues cannot be local because of the "interconnectedness of global com-
merce.") These scholars mistake cause and effect. The causes of environmental
degradation are local, the effects are, or can be, international. The primary goal of envi-
ronmental regulation should be to police causes, not effects. Therefore, environmental
regulation is best arranged as a more locally-focused practice.
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of risk allocation.20 8 National regulation, therefore, is best conceived of as
the keystone of a system of environmental management which includes the
variety of means discussed in the preceding sections. The next Part consid-
ers national environmental laws and enforcement mechanisms.
111. The Need for and Means of Promoting National Environmental
Regulatory Infrastructures
The preceding Part discussed allocation of environmental costs in a partic-
ular type of transaction, project finance. As noted above, project finance,
as increasingly common means of constructing massive infrastructure
projects, serves as a useful case study to determine the best means of allo-
cating environmental risks and costs imposed by the economic develop-
ment of the developing world.20 9 Given the close analogy between project
finance and large scale development in general, the conclusion that
national environmental regulation is the best way to allocate environmental
risk in international project finance transactions indicates that national
regulation is also the best way to regulate the environmental degradation
caused by development of the physical infrastructure of developing nations
generally. 210
National environmental regulation in the developing nations has con-
sistently expanded and developed over the past several decades.2 1 1 Pre-
sumably, this is because those nations view national regulation as an
effective means of shifting environmental costs. Among developing
nations, however, there is wide variation in the enforcement of existing
laws 2 12 as well as in the extent and quality of environmental rule mak-
208. Silveira, supra note 185, at 10 ("International agreements are ratified by states,
and compliance is the responsibility of states. Meaning is derived from international
agreements only as each state fulfills its obligations to translate international law into
national legislation, regulation and institutions."); BRA&Es, supra note 67, at 34-35;
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, supra note 2, at 82. This relationship is exemplified
by the fact that there are ongoing "changes in government regulations [for protecting the
environment] which... are pushing many private companies to go further than the
[existing] minimum legal standards." BOND & CArER, supra note 91, at ii. Unfortu-
nately, this regulatory capacity will not be built up overnight. A national scheme must
sometimes reflect a measure of flexibility, to accommodate the variety of national eco-
nomic needs, and harmony, so that commercial interests are better served.
209. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
210. This assertion does not mean that the other means examined here do not have a
place in the allocative process. In fact, as we have seen, contract and international law,
as well as the assessment criteria of public lenders, are valuable tools. These means,
however, are insufficient by themselves and require a national system to be sufficiently
effective.
211. See BAKER & McKEN zE, ENvlRoNmENrAL LAw AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 1-2
(Osvaldo R.I. Agatiello ed., 1995). See also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
212. See Goodwillie et al., supra note 24, at 9. Goodwillie divides states into three
tiers:
In this regard, nations can be classed in approximately three levels of progres-
sively lower administrative regulation: (1) The United States, the nations of
Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia (highly regulated); (2) Adminis-
tratively centralized and developing countries, e.g. Venezuela, Turkey, Indonesia,
and former Eastern Bloc countries (significant regulation; frequently overlap-
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ing.2 13 Most developing nations still do not effectively manage their natu-
ral environments either because their environmental laws and regulations
are insufficiently defined or, if the laws are sufficiently defined, because of
insufficient enforcement. 214 The following sections explore how national
environmental regulatory infrastructures are formed, what characteristics
such systems should have, and how the formation of such systems in devel-
oping nations can be promoted.
A. The Stages of Development of Regulation
Environmental regulation, like most laws, originates from concern about a
public problem. Strong concern for the environment has only appeared
during the last three decades, first in developed nations and more recently
in developing nations.215 In developing nations, environmental activism
has manifested itself in both national popular political movements 216 and
in the formation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 2 17 Both of
ping because of very large public sector); (3) relatively poor developing nations,
e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa (little regulation and typically very highly centralized).
Id. See also Silveira, supra note 185, at 11.
213. The emphasis on national legislation as the best means of allocating environ-
mental risk is not incompatible with harmonization of national laws. Developing
nations should be encouraged to harmonize their laws as much as possible and should
be subject to international legal minimums so that gross environmental harms are
legally barred. However, developing nations should be permitted to develop independ-
ent systems that take into account their development needs even if higher environmental
costs are incurred. Perhaps a set of global standards could be gradually phased in to
mitigate the harm to the environment caused by laggard, grossly polluting nations.
214. From the perspective of the host developing nation, "[tihe key components of
environmental management are policy, law and administration." BRa&ES, supra note 67,
at 5. The environmental legislation in many developing nations is inadequate to meet
the task of effective environmental protection. Id. Even where there is legislation on the
books, often it is ineffective because adequate regulations are not promulgated, technical
standards are not established, and sufficient administrative capacity is neither allocated
nor funded. Id. at 35, 70-71.
215. See, e.g., HAMMER & SHETrY, supra note 13, at 3; TwENTY YEARS, supra note 196, at
1.
216. See GREG BANKOFF, CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: STATE AND SOCI.
Er- IN MamrnME SOUTHEAST Asia 14 (1993). Bankoff observes that, in Southeast Asian
nations:
[t]he state is now subject to pressure from a new source, one that has histori-
cally exerted a negligible influence on policy. [In maritime Southeast Asia,]
[p]ublic opinion, both domestic and international, has found a voice .... The
environmental concerns of an increasingly literate and better informed public
opinion is having an effect on restraining government policies that favour the
non-sustainable exploitation of the natural resources within their national
boundaries.
Id. Public consciousness of environmental issues has grown in Latin America as well.
See, e.g., Peru, Environmental Concern Grows, National Trade Data Bank Market Reports,
Oct. 5, 1995, at para. 1; Argentina - Environmental Technologies, NATIONAL TRADE DATA
BANK MARxET REPORTS, July 16, 1996, at 1.
217. Scholars have identified several of the functions of NGOs that are consistent
with such a role. These functions include: intelligence or "the gathering, analysis, and
dissemination of information relevant to decisionmaking;" promotion, or the "advocacy
of policy alternatives to authoritative decisionmakers either directly or indirectly
through a broader public;" and prescription, or the designation of policies, namely
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these phenomena play a large part in the formation of national regulatory
systems.218 Further, the emerging environmental consciousness manifest
in these two phenomena is usually the motivating force that prompts
nations to move from the pre-environmental stage through the three "stages
of choice,"219 outlined below.
rulemaking. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH.J. INT'L LAW 183, 271-72 (1997). See also James Cameron, Compli-
ance, Citizens, and NGOs, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTEMNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 29 (James Cameron et al. eds., 1996) (calling NGOs "increasingly important non-
state manifestation[s] of collective expression of individual will and aspiration"). The
important role which NGOs play in environmental politics is indicated by Chapter 27 of
Agenda 21 which begins by stating that NGOs "play a vital role in the shaping and
implementation of participatory democracy." Agenda 21, supra note 192, ch. 27.
218. Effective national environmental policy is most likely to be implemented if there
is a nexus between the popular will (whether expressed directly or through NGOs), on
the one hand, and government institutions on the other. Chapter 27 of Agenda 21 rec-
ognizes this nexus and states that "to ensure that the full potential contribution of non-
governmental organizations is realized, the fullest possible communication and coopera-
tion between international organizations, national, and local governments and non-gov-
ernmental organizations should be promoted." See Agenda 21, supra note 192, ch. 27.
219. The economists Mercuro and Ryan use this term for their model of environmen-
tal public policy formation. The first of the three "stages of choice" is the "constitutional
stage of choice" during which the members of a society "seek to spell out the behavioral
limits of what is and what is not mutually acceptable conduct and lay out the so-called
rules for making rules." NICHOLAS MERCURO ET AL., ECOLOGY, LAw AND ECONOMICS: THE
SIMPLE ANALYrICS oF NATuRAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONoMIcs 78-80 (1994).
The constitution forms the basic mold in which the regulatory institutions are cast, and
establishes a legal basis for the regulation of the environment. Many developing nations
have recently included rules for making environmental provisions in their fundamental
charters. E. Brandl & H. Brungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protec-
tion: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 HARv. ENV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992)
(stating that "[e]nvironmental values or rights may be constitutionalized under two gen-
eral approaches: explicitly, by passing constitutional amendments, or implicitly, by
interpreting existing constitutional language to provide environmental protections").
This incorporation of environmental concerns into a nation's foundational document
deeply roots regulation of the environment in that nation's political, social, and adminis-
trative structures and demonstrates the political power of the movement to regulate envi-
ronmental harms. Brandl and Brungert further argue that:
[c]onstitutional implementation enables environmental protection to achieve the
highest rank among legal norms, a level at which a given value trumps every
statute, administrative rule, or court decision.... In addition, addressing envi-
ronmental concerns at the constitutional level means that environmental protec-
tion need not depend on narrow majorities in legislative bodies. Rather,
environmental protection is more firmly rooted in the legal order because consti-
tutional provisions ordinarily may be altered only pursuant to elaborate proce-
dures by a special majority, if at all.
Id. at 14.
The next stage identified by Mercuro and Ryan is the "institutional stage of choice,"
during which the functional rules for the management of conduct affecting the environ-
ment are formulated. MERCURO E-r AL., supra, at 80. This stage "focuses directly on the
structure of the political/legal institutions (more commonly referred to as the State) as
well as the revision of those institutional structures.... It is the specific working rules -
the complex set of rules that give rise to the institutional decision-making processes ....
Id. This stage typically creates, or incorporates from parallel regulatory schemes, a com-
plex system of legislative, administrative, judicial and civilian decision makers. Id. It is
often an open system in which the working rules are shaped and reshaped over time in
response to new information and shifting political pressures. Id. By effectively creating
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Typically, nations begin in the "pre-environmental stage," where there
is little or no environmental regulation, and little or no consciousness of
environmental issues. The only "environmental law" is a body of common
law, for example, nuisance law, water rights, or uncollected statutes that
unsystematically address other specific environmental problems.2 20 These
rules largely protect private property rights and cases are brought by indi-
vidual claimants. The rules do not provide for enforcement by an agent of
the state such as an administrative agency.221
Against this legal backdrop, growing public consciousness of the con-
sequences of unregulated development, human settlement, and exploita-
tion of resources prompts the initiation, expansion, and revision of
regulatory systems. 22 2 For many nations, this process begins with consti-
tutional action. They revise or reinterpret their constitutions, effectively
rooting environmental concern in the fundamental charter of the
nation.223 Subsequent to this constitutional revision, institutional choices
are made, usually in the form of a broad legislative mandate which may do
incentives, this stage seeks to, "correctly channel behavior so as to enable a society to
internalize environmental externalities. .. ." Id. at 81.
The third stage of choice is the "economic impact stage of choice." Id. at 80. This
stage of choice is predicated on the idea that "there are three distinct property right
systems for organizing and controlling the allocation of society's scarce resources: the
market sector, the public sector, and the communal sector." Id. at 81. In a pure market
sector, each individual owns more or less rights to use goods and resources. Id. These
rights in a perfect market sector will be completely specified - i.e. clearly delineated,
exclusive, transferable, enforceable - and enforced. Id. In such a system, individuals
will specialize and trade their rights to optimize their well being. Id. In a perfect public
sector, however, all resources are allocated and distributed by the State in the form of
status rights, rights to claim a particular quantity and quality of resources. Id. These
rights are non-transferable and are conferred at the discretion of the state's government.
Id. In the communal sector, the individuals in the society decide what resources will be
owned by and be available to all equally. These rights would therefore be non-exclusive
and so non-transferable. Id. Instead of being distinct systems of resource allocation,
however, "typically, all three systems operate contemporaneously to allocate resources."
Id. In a modern society, members of that society:
in attempting to promote economic growth and development as well as fostering
actions to enhance and protect their environment and natural resources, will act
both individually and collectively to revise the constitution, to structure and
restructure the institutional working rules, and to alter the property rights (be
they private, status, or communal) in the market, public or communal sectors in
order to achieve an allocation of resources that will enhance their individual
welfare.
Id. at 83. In fact, this model provides an accurate account of the formation of environ-
mental regulation in particular developing nations.
220. See PERcrvA. Er AL., supra note 17, at 72.
221. Id. at 133, fig. 2.4.
222. See, e.g., PEicivAI E-r AL., supra note 17, at 4-6 (describing this process in the
United States).
223. There are many examples of the recent "constitutionalization" of environmental
law in developing nations. See, e.g., ARG. CO sT. art. 41 (1994) (Argentina); COLUM.
CONsT. arts. 78-82 (1991) (Colombia); CONGO CONST. art. 46 (1992); USTAvA CR art. 35
(1992) (Czechoslovakia); INDUa CONST. (as amended to the 78th Amendment Act, 1995)
art. 48A (article 48A was a part of the Forty Second Amendment Act of 1976); COSTA
RicA CONsT. art. 50 (as amended by Law 7412, June 3, 1994); PoLxAND CONST. art, 74
(1997); REP. KoREA CONST. art. 35 (1987).
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any or all of the following: address natural resource protection, environ-
mental management, and pollution control;224 establish an environmental
administrative agency that is either independent or is a part of another
existing agency;225 grant that agency authority to promulgate and enforce
implementing regulations; 226 and/or consolidate any existing law of envi-
ronmental protection and planning in a single comprehensive statute.227
The third, or economic, stage of choice follows this legislative stage.
During this third stage, the nation utilizes the market, public, or communal
sectors to regulate environmental harm. 2 28 Typically, nations develop
administrative regulations, which are promulgated and enforced by an
environmental regulatory apparatus that either employs market incentives
or allocates particular status rights to apportion environmental rights and
resources.
229
224. A list of such areas of regulation might include: protection of air quality; protec-
tion of water; protection of natural resources; protection of wildlife; regulation of hazard-
ous substances including chemicals; land use planning; agricultural regulation; energy
regulation; protection of cultural resources; and noise regulation. See Brian J. Nicker-
son, The Environmental Laws of Zimbabwe: A Unique Approach to Management of the
Environment, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 189, 228 (1994).
Examples of such statutes include: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 43214370 (1994) (United States); Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordi-
nance No. XXXVII of 1983, XXI Pakistan Code 109 (preamble); Environmental Protec-
tion Law of the People's Republic of China, chs. I, II & III (1979); Federal Law of
Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination (1971) (Mexico); Environmen-
tal Quality Act of 1974 (Malaysia), in GREG BANKoFF & KYLIE ELSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGuLATION IN MALAYSIA AM SINGAPORE 18-21, 25-33 (1994); Environmental Protection
Act (1991) (S. Korea).
225. See, e.g., Decree 177,2/24/92, B.O. 1/30/92 (creating Argentinean Secretariat of
National Resources and Human Environment); Pakistan Environmental Ordinance No.
XXXVII of 1983, supra note 224, § 5; Organic Law of the Environment, Official Gazette
No. 31,004 of 16June 1976, art. 14 (Venezuela); The Enhancement and Conservation of
National Environmental Quality Act, BE 2535, § 3 (1992) (Thailand); General Law of
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (1988) (Mexico).
226. See, e.g., Lester Ross, The Environmental Dimension of Trade and Investment, in
TmwvAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAw 625 n.31 (Mitchell A. Silk ed., 1994) (discussing
Taiwan's creation of an administrative agency to regulate the environment); BANKOF &
ELSTON, supra note 224 (discussing the Environmental Public Health Act 1974 (Singa-
pore)); Criminal Law of the Environment (Official Gazette No. 4,358 Extraordinary of 5
December 1991) (Venezuela); Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of
China, supra note 224, ch. IV.
227. See, e.g., S.K. CHOUDHURI, ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION IN INDIA 6-76 (1996)
(summarizing the Environment Protection Act, 1986, No. 29 of 1986, § 1, 1 (1986)
(India)); 1994 Environmental Framework Law, No. 19,300 (Chile); General Law of Eco-
logical Equilibrium and Protection of the Environment (1988) (Mexico); Federal Law
No. 6,938 (8/31/81) (Brazil); BANKoi & ELSTON, supra note 224, at 13 (discussing
Malaysia's adoption of an integrated approach to the environment with its Environmen-
tal Quality Act of 1974).
228. See MEmcuRo ET AL., supra note 219, at 81-86.
229. Environmental legislation and regulation in developing nations is often modeled
on the established laws and administrative mechanisms of developed nations. Adminis-
trator William K. Reilly of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency noted: "[tlo an
extraordinary degree, the world looks to EPA to chart the course of environmental pro-
tection. What we do here is watched closely and borrowed almost immediately." A
Vision for EPA's Future: An Interview With William K. Reilly, EPAJ., Sept-Oct. 1990, at 6.
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Subsequently, nations make further institutional choices, often after a
great deal of time and political effort, and enact more particular additional
environmental legislation, thus creating a more comprehensive regulatory
and planning system of environmental rights and responsibilities.2 30 Typi-
cally, nations implement such legislation using the existing administrative
structure. The approach, however, may make a different economic choice
by allocating rights by different means so that the market, public, or com-
munal sectors each carry more or less of the burden of regulation.231
B. Factors That Affect the Development of NERIs in Developing Nations
Though it provides a useful overview of what the progression of environ-
mental regulation in developing nations consists of, this "stages of choice"
analysis tells us little about which particular factors influence that progres-
sion through the three stages. This section discusses some of the factors
that cause or promote the development of national environmental regula-
tory infrastructures in developing nations.
1. Public Will
Development of a comprehensive environmental regulation system in devel-
oping nations usually stems from public dissatisfaction with the pollution
and degradation of the environment on which that public depends for their
230. See Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1995, reprinted in Pakistan Law
Digest, Martindale-Hubbell International Law Digest, Pak-3 (1996); 1992 Enhancement
and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, BE 2535 (1992) (Thailand),
reprinted in John R. Carino, Environmental Law of Thailand 13 (1996), in 2 COMPARATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND REGULATION 13 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1997). This process
can take a considerable length of time. One Thai environmental practitioner has
observed that:
it takes too long to deal with environmental problems because it takes so long to
pass legislation .... [There is] a three year delay to pass legislation implement-
ing policy in Thailand. Similarly.... it can take anywhere from three months to
five years to enact legislation in Hong Kong. Somehow, it seems that all over the
world, the more important the problem, the longer it takes to enact legislation
and a proper enforcement scheme.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, A.B.A., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN
PACIFIC RIM NATIONS 162-63 (1993) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION].
231. For example, in the United States, the regulatory approach is shifting from com-
mand and control regulation to market-based incentives. Richard B. Stewart, Models for
Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C.
ENvrL. AFFIAs L. REV. 547, 552 (1992). See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these different regulatory approaches. In the market sector, all prop-
erty is privately owned and the sole means of transfer is voluntary exchange. MERCURO
ET AL., supra note 219, at 81-82. Individuals are expected to specialize in producing a
particular skill or service and then to engage in trade with other such specialists to
maximize their well being. In the public sector, the allocation and distribution of all
resources is determined by the state by means of the assignment of nontransferable
status rights to individuals or groups who then may gain access to goods and resources.
Id. at 82-83. In the communal sector, the individuals who make up a society decide that
certain or all property is to be owned communally and be available to all. In a commu-
nal system, property is nontransferable. Id. at 83.
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health and prosperity.232 The public bears most of the costs of environ-
mental externalities. Therefore, it makes sense that the public, or promi-
nent sectors of it, become dissatisfied with the status quo and push for a
different course of action with respect to those harms.233
Unregulated economic development, like rapid population growth, is a
primary cause of environmental degradation and gives rise to increasing
public will to regulate the environment. 234 Economic growth typically
expands the middle-class that looks for improved quality of life, an impor-
tant part of which is a cleaner environment, prompting demands for
increased regulation.235 One World Bank study has shown that, in a sam-
ple of nations, as per capita income increases, so does regulation of the
environment.236 Environmental regulation, however, typically does not
occur until a nation has addressed more fundamental social needs such as
feeding its population (or at least a substantial portion of it) or addressing
any chronic public health issues.237 Thus, environmental regulation
depends on a nation having sufficient public will to push for the regulation
of environmental degradation. In turn, that public will often depends
upon the nation having sufficient financial and administrative capacity in
the public sector to address more than the most fundamental social needs.
In addition to pushing the public sector directly, the public's environ-
mental will in developing nations manifests itself in the formation and
growth of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 23 8
NGOs not only serve as a mouthpiece for the public will, they also carry
out a range of functions that promote environmental compliance in the
nation: advocating for particular environmental legislation or regulation,
providing training of environmental experts, monitoring local actors for
compliance with government regulation, bringing enforcement actions in
nations that permit citizen enforcement of environmental laws, and educat-
232. See PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 17, at 4-6; BANKon' & ELSTON, supra note 224, at
49-50; supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
233. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, POVERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3,54
(1990). In fact, poor people bear a disproportionate share of the cost of environmental
degradation since "they tend to live in poor health and sanitary conditions in polluted
urban areas and cannot afford to protect themselves or move." ESKELAND & JIMINEZ,
supra note 15, at 44. See also UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INs-TUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELoP-
MENT, DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT AND PEOPLE: REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE ON THE
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 5 (1992). However,
it is typically the upwardly mobile middle class who exert the most political pressure for
environmental regulation in order to further enhance their quality of life.
234. For example, Singapore expanded its environmental regulation because it saw "a
need to satisfy the environmental aspirations ...and recreational demands of an
increasingly mobile managerial and professional class .. " BANKOFF & ELSTON, supra
note 224, at 49-50. See also Peru, Environmental Concern Grows, supra note 216, 1 1.
235. See BANKOFF & ELSTON, supra note 224, at 49-50.
236. POLICY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
AND DEVELOPMENT: A CROss-CouNTRY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 22 (1995) [hereinafter CRoss-
COUNTRY].
237. See, e.g., TwENTY YEARS, supra note 196, at 2 (quoting Houari Boum~dienne, for-
mer President of Algeria, who stated that "[i]f improving the environment means less
bread for the Algerians, then I am against it.").
238. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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ing the public regarding the importance of the environment.239 Like the
public, NGOs have forced many of the pro-environment choices in develop-
ing nations while facing stiff political opposition.240
2. The Rule of Law
Many developing nations lack the particular legal institutions needed in
order to create an effective NERI. these nations lack trained legal personnel
as well as independent judicial or administrative decision makers to make
impartial determinations based upon rules. In fact, political power often
prevents the promulgation of legal rules, or, if rules are promulgated, stifles
their enforcement. The problem stems from "[t]he shortcomings of the
institutions responsible for enforcing environmental legislation administra-
tively and judicially."241
Many developing nations lack an effective and independent judici-
ary.242 Worse still, in some nations, particular interest groups, typically
the very wealthy, control the legislature or the judiciary. This makes the
enactment of environmental legislation difficult and results in the uneven
enforcement of any enacted legislation. For example, in Indonesia, "the
courts have not shown a willingness to act independently of executive pol-
icy or against well-connected parties and have been strongly criticised [sic]
for their weakness in applying basic principles of environmental law."2 4 3
Enforcement of environmental norms there has been mainly against
smaller corporations and not against the more powerful larger corpora-
tions.24 4 In order to effectively deter environmental harms, a nation must
establish a credible regulatory infrastructure. A central part of such a cred-
ible infrastructure are administrative and judicial systems which demon-
strate the cardinal Rule of Law principle that conduct should be governed
by laws, promulgated in advance, and not by the arbitrary decisions of men
or women.
245
239. See id.; WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 142.
240. See Phillippe J. Sands, Environment, Community and International Law, 20 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 393, 394 (1989); ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 96, 159.
241. BRA&Es, supra note 67, at 45.
242. WORLD BANK, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES: LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
44 (1995).
243. CAROL WARREN & KYLIE ELSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN INDONESIA 12
(1994).
244. Id. Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has observed that:
Although many countries have passed laws and regulations to protect the envi-
ronment and natural resources, and to control polution, no illusions should be
nursed on this score. The legislation is rarely enforced for lack of sufficient
technical and administrative resources and sometimes because of powerful
groups which derive incomes from the rapid exploitation [of the environment]
and are able to modify or bypass the conservation measures.
Randall Baker, Institutional Innovation, Development, and Environmental Management:
An Administrative Trap Revisited, Part 1, 9 PUB. ADMIN. & DEv. 45 (1989) (quoting OECD,
Aid and Environmental Protection Ten Years After Stockholm (1982)).
245. GEOFFREY DEQ. WALKER, THE RULE of: LAw 1 (1988).
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Even in a developed nation (like the United States) that has a sophisti-
cated administrative apparatus, a sophisticated judiciary, and substantial
funding for addressing environmental problems, "the number of [environ-
mental] violations overwhelm[s] the enforcement capacity of [the govern-
ment." 24 6 This problem becomes more aggravated in the developing
world where there are far fewer government resources, unsophisticated
industrial technology, and greater populations to be regulated. Enforce-
ment resources are limited and there are a tremendous number and variety
of regulatory targets that must be brought into compliance if enforcement
is to be effective. 247 Also, regulations are often poorly designed and diffi-
cult to enforce.248 Developing nations, however, need some measure of
credible regulation if their laws are to affect their people's conduct. If there
is not a system of rules, a means of ascertaining whether a rule violation
has occurred, and an adjudicator who has the authority to impose sanc-
tions upon rule breakers, then there is little chance that those in the partic-
ular jurisdiction will respect the paper law restrictions placed upon the use
of the environment.249
3. The Lack of Fair and Established Private Property Rights; Inadequate
Human Rights
Environmental reform is often at odds with existing property rights as well
as with human rights.250 In many developing nations, one primary imped-
iment to forming a substantial environmental regulatory infrastructure is
that in order to form such a system, massive reform of property rights
would be necessary.251 This reform of laws with respect to rights of pri-
246. PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 17, at 1039.
247. See id. at 1040. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
248. Id.
249. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION, ECONOMIC INSTRU-
MENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter OECD] (noting "gross violations" of town and country laws: "30 story buildings with
perfectly legal papers dominate in areas where 3 stories is the legal maximum.").
250. Warren and Elston have observed that:
[In Indonesia,] [mlounting evidence of the economic and social costs of environ-
mental degradation, the rise of a middle class, and the connection between envi-
ronmental questions and other hotly contested political issues such as conflicts
over land tenure and resources, the rights of workers, farmers and indigenous
minorities, the demand for democratization and greater press freedom all played
a part in moving the environment to center stage.
WARREN & ELSTON, supra note 243, at 7. See also id. at 16 (discussing relationship
between environmental regulation and "poverty alleviation").
251. See ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 121. This is because
"[s]ound environmental policies are likely to be powerfully redistributive." WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 2. Speaking about the Philippines, one
local lawyer opined that:
[i]ntrinsic to protecting our forests is empowering the people living in them. In
our case, they are indigenous peoples. The eight million indigenous residents
stand to lose now, because our culture and legal system do not recognize their
property tenure relationships and claim that they do not own the land but are
merely squatters because they are on public lands. The problem is whether we
should maintain this kind of loss or incligenize our property systems such that
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vate property ownership, limitations on the use of privately owned prop-
erty ("regulatory takings" issues), and limitations on the use of public
property very often runs counter to the interests of very large landown-
ers.25 2 Typically, these parties are often the most politically and economi-
cally powerful members of the society, making legal and political changes
that adversely affect them very difficult to obtain.2 53
With respect to human rights, one commentator has observed that
"[iln many developing nations an attitude of disregard for the environment
goes hand in hand with manifest violations of basic human rights; primar-
ily of rural populations, women and indigenous peoples."25 4 The fact that
environmental regulation has a substantial nexus with these divisive, com-
plex political issues makes the establishment of an effective NERI consider-
ably more difficult to achieve.
4. The Costs of Regulation
The issue of who will pay the tremendous costs of forming an environmen-
tal regulatory infrastructure is another related fundamental political issue
regarding environmental regulation of developing nations. Internalizing
costs means that once "free" activities must be paid for by someone, they
cannot remain free. These costs include: retro-fitting or new construction
of capital facilities so that they are more environmentally friendly, public
education to promote environment-friendly conduct, and the funding of a
substantial regulatory apparatus.
There are several reasons why developing nations are reluctant or
unable to pay these costs. First, in many cases, they do not have the money
eventually we can empower the indigenous peoples. [This] situation can be
[said to exist] in other countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, [and] Thailand.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 121.
Following redistribution, stable property rights should be encouraged and developed
in order to promote an effective regulatory system. See CRoss COUNTRY, supra note 236,
at 16; HAMMER & SHETTY, supra note 13, at 3. One reason that established private prop-
erty rights are beneficial is that private parties tend to use their own property in a man-
ner that is much more conservative and less harmful to the environment than does a
user of public property. This is because, in a private property regime, externalities such
as resource depletion and pollution are borne largely by the private owner rather than
by the public. See PERcvIAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 131. Of course this is true more for
resource exploitation and for pollution of the soil and groundwater, pollution that
remains upon the property rather than pollution that is carried away, externalized, by a
stream of water or air. This often noted "tragedy of the commons" is diminished by
private ownership. Id.
252. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 104 ("During [the
Marcos regime in the Philippines], the problem was not so much the lack of laws but a
disregard for them whenever they interfered with government priorities.... [L]aws were
ignored whenever projects were deemed crucial to the government at the time.").
253. See id.
254. Matthew Nimetz, Book Review, 6 HAv. HuM. RTs. J. 253 (1993). Also, see the
1996 incident involving Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria where nine environmental activists
speaking out against Shell Oil's practices in that country were executed for their activi-
ties. Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic of Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 11, 1995, at 1.
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to pay them.25 5 In effect, having no cash, the only thing these nations have
to spend is their natural resources. Second, even if a particular developing
nation can afford to erect some sort of regulatory system, political or
administrative decision makers are likely to believe that regulation will
advesely affect the nation's international economic competitiveness by
increasing the cost of the goods produced in the country. 25 6 Third, many
nations feel that it is their sovereign right to pollute within their borders in
order to grow their economies.2 57 Fourth, even if they could afford to pay
these costs, given their limited resources, they believe the money could be
better spent elsewhere. 25 8 These nations would rather spend the value of
their natural resources than spend money to conserve those resources for
the future. Given the developing nations' inability and reluctance to pay
for a new regulatory framework, the developed nations may have to provide
substantial funding if the developing nations are to systematically regulate
the use of their natural environments. 25
9
Environmental regimes in developing nations, even if they make it to
the point when there are laws on the books, often have poor actual enforce-
ment.260 The next section makes several recommendations which, if
implemented, would promote the formation and effective enforcement of
environmental regulations in developing nations.
C. Characteristics of an Effective National Environmental Regulatory
Infrastructure (NERI) -
1. The System Should Suit the Needs of the Particular Nation
The first concern in designing a national environmental regime is that it
suits the needs of a particular nation. The unique needs and public priori-
ties of a given nation must be taken into account to ensure the effectiveness
of the regime. 26 1 Many developing nations have modeled their environ-
mental regulations upon those of the more developed countries. 26 2 These
255. Cynthia B. Schultz & Tamara Raye Crockett, Economic Development, Democrati-
zation, and Environmental Protection in Eastern Europe, 18 B.C. ENvTL. Asi. L. REv. 53,
58, n.28 (1990); WILSON, supra note 24, at 969-71.
256. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitive-
ness, 102 YALE Lj. 2039, 2056 (1993).
257. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
259. Maurice Strong, the secretary general of the Earth Summit, estimated that devel-
oping nations would require up to $125 billion per year in financial assistance to imple-
ment effective environmental management systems and steer their economies on a more
sustainable course. Mark Lewis, Balancing Industry with the Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1992, at A3. See also Schultz & Crockett, supra note 255, at 58 n.28.
260. See BcaKE & McKENzIE, supra note 211, at 1; BRA~us, supra note 67, at 106-07.
261. See Wilson, supra note 27, at 954.
262. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. One practitioner stated that:
There are plenty of laws on the books in East Asia to address environmental
issues, but many are misguided and over-reactive. Most laws are based on
OECD models that set ambitious goals for pollutants and environmental indica-
tors, and rely primarily on source-specific standards. But experience in environ-
mental policymaking over the past three decades in OECD countries
demonstrates that these laws can be costly. The cost of environmental regula-
Cornell International Law Journal
laws, which typically set physical standards and are expensive to adminis-
ter, often are ineffective in developing nations because of a lack of informa-
tion at the rule design stage as well as a lack of sufficient administrative
capacity to enforce those rules.2 63 The result is that inappropriate stan-
dards are weakly enforced. To be effective, environmental law requires a
country-specific approach which takes into account the technical, finan-
cial, and administrative capabilities of the individual nation.264
A central issue in environmental regulation is whether "command and
control" type regulation is better than regulation that uses economic incen-
tives.265 An example of a "command and control" regulation is a require-
ment that a facility emit less than a specified level of a pollutant or a
requirement that a facility employ a particular pollution-reducing technol-
ogy.2 66 The main criticism of this type of regulation is that it does not
offer any incentives to the operator of a facility to reduce a facility's pollu-
tion below the mandated level.26 7 Once the mandated level is reached or
the mandated technology is installed, the facility is in compliance with the
law and no further reduction in pollution will benefit the operator. In con-
trast, economic incentives seek to directly impose the cost of each unit of
pollution upon the operator by means of taxes on the consumption of a
resource or on facility emissions. 268 The goal of economic incentives is to
reflect the full cost of pollution in the pricing of the goods or services
produced. Therefore, proponents of this means of regulation argue that
government subsidies on resources should be ended and charges should be
imposed on all pollution to reflect accurately the cost of that pollution. 269
The end result, of course, is to pass the cost on to consumers in the form of
a higher price for the goods or services, rather than to impose the cost on
the natural environment. Like most dichotomies, however, the characteri-
zation of the issue as command and control versus economic incentives
obscures the best answer. In fact, the better choice will depend on the
decision maker's particular environmental goal and the decision maker's
priorities with respect to competing environmental values.270
tion is particularly relevant in East Asia, where despite the recent rapid growth,
many social needs still remain unaddressed.
BAKER & McKENZIE, supra note 211, at 12.
263. Smith, supra note 94, at 12-13.
264. Speaking of East Asian countries, one commentator has observed that,
"[s]ophisticated and costly monitoring requirements remain beyond the financial and
technical capabilities of most environmental regulatory agencies ... despite their best
efforts." Id. at 13.
265. Professor McGarity has suggested 6 criteria for evaluating and comparing regu-
latory strategies: (1) administrative feasibility, (2) survivability (under existing condi-
tions of judicial and political review), (3) enforceability, (4) efficiency, (5) fairness and
equity, and (6) ability to encourage technological advance. Thomas McGarity, Media-
Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental
Regulation, 46 LAw & CoNmMp. PROBs. 159 (1983).
266. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 231, at 548.
267. See id. at 550.
268. See id. at 548.
269. See HAMMER & SHEry, supra note 13, at 3.
270. See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 166-76.
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The trend in the international institutions examining the issue of envi-
ronmental regulation in developing nations is to favor the use of economic
incentives such as taxes, accurate pricing of resources, tradable pollution
permits, and the elimination of subsidies. 2 71 However, this predisposition
may have more to do with the fact that the authors of these documents
either are themselves economists or are heavily influenced by economists
who tend to prioritize efficiency gains over other values. In defense of a
command and control approach, the former head of the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency argued in favor of the United States' primar-
ily command and control environmental regime:
The thrust of these [environmental] statutes ... has been to set deadlines
that were tough, mandate standards that were tough, force technology and
the state of the art. I have fully supported that approach. I think it has made
complete good sense. It has succeeded in getting the country off the mark,
so to speak, in dealing with the problems. It probably carries with it certain
penalties in terms of efficiency, both technological efficiency and economic
efficiency. But I think that up to now these have been costs that have been
well worth paying in order to get the country moving on these programs. If
we had started to fine tune from the beginning, I think we would still be fine
tuning and we would have very little progress in terms of cleanup.
2 7 2
Command and control regulation may be more effective at getting an envi-
ronmental regulatory system in place in the first instance, a starting posi-
tion in which many developing nations find themselves currently.273 The
standards established by command and control regulations are clear and
are more easily monitored and enforced than the constant reevaluation of
the economic costs of particular resources and pollution that must be
271. See HAMMER & SHErrY, supra note 13, at v passim; Ben Boer, Institutionalising
Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of National, State, and Local Governments
in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action, 31 WiLiLuvmE L. Rev. 307, 324 (1995).
272. Status of the Programs and Policies of the Environmental Protection Agency, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. of Public Works, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977) (statement of Russell Train) [hereinafter Status of EPA].
273. Additionally, developing nations pose particular problems that economists'
models may not account for sufficiently. One commentator points out that:
The scarcity of public funds in many LDCs, the need to protect the poor and consid-
erations of political economy all indicate that transfer mechanisms are not well
developed. Efficiency criteria then need to be supplemented by considering the
distributive impact of different policy instruments. Weak institutions may
severely hamper access to information and the ability to monitor damages and
implement sophisticated schemes. Under these conditions, it is necessary to ana-
lyze what can be achieved through imperfect incentives based on blunt, indirect
instruments, for instance by applying presumptive pollution taxes to fuels. Fur-
ther, the frequently applied assumption of a competitive market structure may be
less realistic (but not necessarily less useful as a base line) in an LDC context
than in an industrialized market economy. The role and functioning of instru-
ments such as taxes and quantitative regulations will of course not be the same
in the presence of market power, soft budget constraints and administered prices,
as under the standard assumptions.
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reflected in the pricing of the economic incentives.2 74 In deciding between
the two types, regulators should look at the regulatory goals, and the
amount of resources at their, and the target of the regulation's, disposal,
and then decide which form of regulation will best achieve those goals.2 7 5
2. Private Enforcement Actions Should Be Available
Another characteristic of an effective regulatory system is the assurance of
public access to national courts and meaningful remedies for those seeking
environmental enforcement or redress. 27 6 While the United States relies
on liability and the threat of citizen suits for much of the enforcement of its
environmental laws and regulations, many nations' judicial systems do not
permit private suits, in which the citizen acts as a "private attorney gen-
eral."27 7 This leaves enforcement to the public agency charged with enforc-
ing the laws, severely limiting the effectiveness of any promulgated
standards.27 8 One Filipino attorney, B. Norman V. Kalagayan, put the
problem in his country as follows: "[alt the same time that too much of the
implementation is conducted by the government, the government acknowl-
edges that it lacks the resources to enforce environmental laws.... These
shortcomings in government enforcement should be complemented by the
private sector."27 9 Even in those countries that permit citizen suits,
problems of proving that a particular actor or class of actors caused the
harm can be very difficult because the polluter has the evidence, or
EsKELAND & JIMiNfz, supra note 15, at 4.
274. But see Status of EPA, supra note 272 (arguing that the World Bank recommends
that even if pricing is uncertain then a system of economic incentives is preferable
because it can always be "fine tuned").
275. For example, proponents of economic incentives point out that, in developing
countries, "there is a mismatch between high regulation, monitoring and enforcement
costs and budgetary, manpower and administrative constraints .... " OECD, supra note
249, at 24.
276. See Mark Spaulding, Transparency of Environmental Regulation and Public Partici-
pation In The Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35 SANrA CLARA L. REv.
1127, 1134 (1992) (noting that these principles are included in the nonbinding United
Nations' Rio Principle 10 and in the North American Free Trade Agreement side
agreements).
277. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 142.
278. With respect to the lack of private rights to litigate, one commentator has
observed that:
[T]he conditions in the United States that allow litigation to flourish are hard to
find elsewhere: well-established environmental laws and duties; agencies that
are open to public scrutiny; individuals or groups with money to spend on dis-
putes; lawyers prepared to sue governments, and governments prepared to be
sued. For someone like Professor Wangari Maathai, leader of the Green Belt
Movement in Kenya, to seek an injunction against the construction of the Kenya
Times Media Trust building in Uhuru Park Nairobi, requires not only the money
to bring a case, but the physical and moral courage to stand up to intimidation
from politicians, from President Moi downwards. In countries dealing with
what Professor Maathai called 'basic human rights issues, basic democracy,
[and] basic willingness to accommodate dissent,' the benefits of U.S. litigation
are difficult to imagine.
Wilson, supra note 27, at 957.
279. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 106.
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because the evidence is too hard to trace back to the polluter, or because
the plaintiffs lack the scientific or legal capacity to muster and present con-
vincing evidence of an environmental violation. 280 Speaking at an Ameri-
can Bar Association Conference on Environmental Regulation in Pacific
Rim Nations, Kalagayan explained that:
[t]he problems encountered in the prosecution of pollution cases are chiefly
logistical. Most of our clients are poor communities or neighborhood
associations that do not have enough money to pay for a chemical analysis
of suspected pollutants. When these associations are pitted against huge
establishments, they usually lose the case due to insufficient evidence or
sheer exhaustion.2 8 1
If the plaintiffs are not deterred by standing or proof problems, then polit-
ical or judicial unwillingness to provide relief under existing laws may nul-
lify their claim. If the political tenor of a country is anti-environmental,
then the institutions charged with enforcing the laws, because often they
are controlled by or beholden to politically motivated actors or are political
creatures themselves, will often fail to enforce those laws.28 2 A political
and legal regime which permits this expression of the public will is prefera-
ble not only because it increases the number of potential enforcers, but
also because a regime which confers such enforcement power is more con-
sistent with democratic principles of government, such as empowerment of
the population and recognition and representation of popular political
constituencies. 283
3. Technical Expertise and Data Useful to the Formation of Environmental
Policies and to Private Environmental Litigators Should Be Collected
and Made Available to the Public
The development of an effective NERI further depends upon the gathering
and analysis of data used to develop environmental policies. Two
problems arise: a shortage of trained experts and a shortage of data which
such experts could compile and analyze. Many developing nations lack the
technical expertise to obtain and analyze such environmental data effec-
tively.284 Because environmental law relies on sciences such as biology,
toxicology, and ecology, a developing nation needs to have a pool of
experts trained in these disciplines to develop and enforce effective poli-
280. See, e.g., id.; WARREN & ELSTON, supra note 243, at 12 ("the Legal Aid Institute
was unable to prosecute their case for compensation in the courts because of the diffi-
culty of proving liability.").
281. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 106.
282. See WARREN & ELSTON, supra note 243, at 12. Warren and Elston observe that:
"Ultimately, upgrading environmental practices depends as much upon the changing
political context within which they operate, as it does on the technical provisions of the
new regulatory regime." Id. See also supra Part III.B.2.
283. Note that those countries that do not permit citizen action often are the coun-
tries with the more restrictive political regimes and are often the most anti-democratic
and reluctant to change their property laws to restrict the use of natural resources by
political elites. See, e.g., Schultz & Crockett, supra note 255, at 53-54.
284. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 142; ANNA DA SOLEDADE
VIEIRA, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION IN DEVELOPING NATIONS 73 (1985).
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cies.285 Additionally, these experts require sufficient laboratory capacity
and other "hardware" to carry out their work.28 6
Having enough data to formulate sound environmental policies and
standards is important because particular legal standards grow out of these
policies and because environmental standards often must be very techni-
cally complex in order to be effective. For example, consider a clean air
regulation which requires that emissions of a particular toxin remain
below a fixed level, for example, ten parts per million. At the rule design
stage, scientific data as to the effects of the toxin are needed to determine
how many parts per million is dangerous to human health. At the rule
enforcement stage, technical capacity is needed to determine whether there
has been a release of more than ten parts per million.28 7 Because of the
intimate relation between environmental law and environmental science,
technical capacity is indispensable to both the design and enforcement of
environmental rules.
Once the technical capacity exists and data is generated (whether at
the initial stage of policy formation or later when the standards are in place
and ongoing compliance monitoring is necessary), public access to envi-
ronmental information becomes an important aspect of an effective
national environmental regulatory scheme. 288 Principle 10 of the Rio Dec-
laration on Environment and Development provides that:
[E]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all con-
cerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual
shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment,
that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous
materials and activities in their communities .... States shall facilitate and
encourage public awareness and participation by making information
widely available. 28 9
This language, included in a non-binding United Nations declaration,
endorses the principle that access to information is necessary to secure
citizen participation in the decision making process with regard to environ-
mental regulation. Access to information also complements the right to
285. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 142.
286. VIEIRA, supra note 284, at 53.
287. One analyst has proposed that the information needs of personnel concerned
with pollution control are the following:
Reliable data on wastes and pollution concentration levels, uniformly col-
lected, synthesized and supplied on a time-series basis.
A recently written authoritative survey or small collection of key surveys,
likely to identify the main problem areas relevant to the discipline, to estab-
lish the technology appropriate for tackling those problems and to draw on
the state of the art in the subject area.
* A list of references appropriate to the problem area under consideration,
A cheap current awareness service to update these references.
- A list of research organizations, research and workers in the specific environ-
mental area of interest.
Id. at 125.
288. See, e.g., Boer, supra note 271, at 332.
289. Rio Declaration, supra note 81, at 878.
Vol. 31
1998 Think Globally, (En)Act Locally
bring private legal enforcement actions against violators discussed above in
Part III.C.3. 290
Often, reporting requirements imposed upon private companies pro-
vide a means of moving otherwise private information into the public
domain, thereby making such information available to the public.291 Addi-
tionally, such disclosure provides the government with information neces-
sary to make and enforce environmental rules.2 92 One example of this
type of approach is the United States Environmental Protection Agency's
website which provides the contents of private firms' disclosures of the
location of hazardous materials within their operations. 293 Such reporting
requirements promote self-regulation by the private sector, promoting com-
pliance with rules that, given the limited resources of environmental agen-
cies, would otherwise not be as well monitored. However, as one
commentator has observed, if reporting requirements are to be an effective
part of a regulatory scheme, "[i]ndustry, environmental groups, and gov-
ernmental agencies must develop uniform standards in terms of scientific
and analytical methodologies and basic problem-solving techniques before
uniform reductions in environmental damage may move forward."294
Creating public access to environmental information allows individual
citizens to gather the information necessary to evaluate the state of their
local environments, to bring effective citizen suits, and to lobby their gov-
ernment to take environmental action, and allows NGOs to collect infor-
mation for their advocacy and lobbying efforts. 295 In facilitating these
efforts, public access is a vital part of an effective national environmental
infrastructure.
4. Policy Makers Should Use Environmental Impact Assessment to
Plan Ahead
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is increasingly being used to pre-
dict the costs of activities that have the potential to harm the environ-
ment.296 By assessing the likely environmental impact of a planned course
290. Id. Access to information potentially addresses the proof problems discussed
above which prevent many citizens from taking legal action.
291. PEacIVAL Er A l., supra note 17, at 1042, 1050.
292. See WORLD DvEaLOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 13, at 14.
293. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Envirofacts Warehouse - Toxics
Release Inventory (last modified Dec. 16, 1997) <http://www.EPA.gov/enviro/html/tris/
tris overview.html>.
294. Barbara A. Boczar, Toward a Viable Environmental Regulatory Framework: From
Corporate Environmental Management to Regulatory Consensus, 6 DEPAUL Bus. UJ. 291,
293 (1994). This may be a good area for international standards to apply because it
establishes a methodology for measuring and calculating damage without imposing par-
ticular quantitative restrictions upon individual nations.
295. See UNim NATIONS RESEAR cH INST rTE FOR SOCIAL DEvELoPMENT, supra note
233, at 9.
296. IMPACT OF ENviRoN MENTAL AssEssMENT, supra note 170, at XV; ENVIRONmENTAL
RISK AssEssMENT, supra note 170, at 8. Note that EIA is a term for a broad approach to
discover the potential environmental harms of a particular project, but beyond this gen-
eral definition there is "little unanimity as to how a comprehensive EIA program should
be administered." ENVIRONmENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 84. EIA is another
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of action, EIA is "a way to tackle pollution problems proactively - evaluat-
ing a project prior to building it and determining whether it should be built
in the first instance - as distinguished from the regulatory model which
merely ensures that whatever is [already] built complies with a standard
.... -297 The concept of EIA had its genesis in the United States in the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), passed in 1970. The Act
required the party proposing the potentially harmful action to make a
detailed statement about:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse envi-
ronmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be imple-
mented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the pro-
posed action should it be implemented.298
Many developing nations have adopted EIA as one component of their reg-
ulatory infrastructure. 2 99 This adoption should be promoted as much as
possible because, absent formal legal requirements that EIA be conducted,
the potential environmental harms of a project are often not perceived or
are ignored. 30 0 Another reason why nations should adopt EIA procedures
is that environmental costs for both the nation and a development project's
sponsor often are considerably reduced by means of careful environmental
planning as opposed to retrospective regulation of current or past
harms.30 1 EIA has been promoted in the international arena, and has been
favorably characterized as a means by which the decision making process
area where international law would be well-suited to provide a broad principle which
individual nations could apply in a variety of ways depending on the particular needs of
the nation.
297. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 84.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994). Ideally, as did the United States government with
NEPA, the developing nation's government would subject its own actions to the EIA
process. This is particularly important in infrastructure development because the vast
majority of that development is carried out by the public sector.
299. For example, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia all have enacted EIA
requirements. See BANKoFI & ELSTON, supra note 224, at 11, 57. So has China. See
ARBARA J. SINicULE & LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
CHINA, Preface (1995). Closer to home, so has Mexico. See Hector Herrera, Mexican
Environmental Legal Framework, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 31, 33 (1994). However, Herrera
goes on to state that:
Singapore stands out from its immediate Southeast Asian Neighbors because of
the absence of a formal EIA procedure.... EIAs have been objected to in Singa-
pore on the grounds that such procedures delay or even inhibit development,
that they add substantially to costs, and that they often introduce factors extra-
neous to the development process.
Id. at 51. It seems likely that the "extraneous" factors Herrera refers to are the kind of
broad public participation referred to supra Part III.B.1.
300. See Nickerson, supra note 224, at 228 (Zimbabwe has "no national legislation
requiring environmental impact assessments to be performed for projects that may have
an adverse effect on the environment. The tendency in some areas, therefore, may be to
overlook environmental problems.").
301. See ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 157.
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can be opened to "broad public participation. '302 It is an essential compo-
nent in any effective NERI.
5. Criminal Sanctions Should be Employed
Criminal sanctions are another effective environmental enforcement mech-
anism that some developing nations employ.303 Enforcement of criminal
sanctions demonstrates that environmental regulation is a priority of the
state and can be an effective deterrent to harmful action.304 However,
selective prosecution has been a widespread problem. Larger, more power-
ful violators use their political influence to avoid being prosecuted.305
This leaves the smaller, less powerful violators, typically smaller busi-
nesses, to bear the brunt of criminal prosecution.30 6 This selective enforce-
ment undercuts the effectiveness of deterrence, discriminates against
smaller businesses, making the market less competitive, and undercuts the
public's perception that environmental enforcement is just. Therefore, in
implementing an NERI which includes criminal sanctions, it is necessary
to monitor the evenhandedness and effectiveness of the enforcement.
D. The International Community Should Promote National Regulation
The international community, specifically the developed nations, should
provide financial and technical assistance to developing nations to estab-
lish effective NERIs. While, as discussed above, international environmen-
tal law is not binding upon individual states until it is ratified by those
states, it does provide a coherent set of broad principles that individual
nations have used as a basis for their own national environmental policies
and legislation.30 7 For example, in 1980, the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), published its
World Conservation Strategy, which prompted many national govern-
ments to implement a national conservation strategy.30 8 In 1982, the
United Nations promulgated its World Charter for Nature which set out
302. Agenda 21, supra note 192, ch. 23.2. Additionally, EIA, when taken seriously by
decision makers is a means of involving a broad range of constituencies in the decision
making process with regard to a given project. See ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra
note 230, at 157. The participation of the public and NGOs should be sought out dur-
ing the EIA process because the consideration of a broader range of interests will usually
yield a better decision. Id.
303. See, e.g.,John W. Head, Using Criminal Sanctions to Fight Environmental Damage
in the P.R.C., 17 E. ASIAN Exuc. REP. 9 (1995) (discussing the promulgation and enforce-
ment in China of criminal sanctions for environmental offenses).
304. PEmcrvAL Er AL., supra note 17, at 1058-60; Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUsTICE 1336, 1340-41 (1983); CRIMINAL LAW AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 7 (Hans-Jorg Albrecht & Seppo Leppa eds., 1992).
305. ENVnRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 230, at 163. This problem is not limited
to the developing nations; selective prosecution is a problem in developed nations too.
Id.
306. Id.
307. See Boer, supra note 271, at 309.
308. Id. at 308.
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further broad principles for the design of national legislation. 309 This was
followed by Agenda 21, promulgated at the 1992 Rio Conference on the
Environment and Development.310 However, while these documents laid
out broad principles, they did not address the design of an effective
national regulatory system that addresses local environmental concerns, a
complex and expensive task. To aid in the development of national regula-
tory systems, the international community, and the developed nations in
particular, must provide technical and financial assistance to the develop-
ing nations.311
Some assistance, often termed "capacity building," has been given.
Capacity building assistance has been given to developing nations by the
IUCN as well as by the World Bank which, as of 1994, had ongoing or
planned projects in twenty-nine developing nations.312 Additionally, the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) provides "technical, legal,
and institutional assistance for the development of national environmental
legislation."313 These providers of assistance present workshops for devel-
oping nations' environmental officials, draft environmental legislation,
review any existing legislation, and supply expert advice to environmental
agencies in developing nations.314 However, these programs are too lim-
ited in scope. Environmental capacity-building assistance to developing
nations should be expanded.
Currently, there are several funding mechanisms by means of which
the developed world transfers money to the developing world for environ-
mental projects, the most prominent of which is the World Bank's Global
Environment Facility (GEF). 315 GEF provides loans for projects that
address biological diversity, forestry, global warming, or ozone depletion
when those projects do not meet traditional lending criteria. However, as
noted above, GEF can only fund projects that address global environmental
degradation, national environmental degradation does not qualify for
funding.316 Also, this fund does not have sufficient resources and has
been criticized for its placement in the World Bank, which has been the
sponsor of a number of projects that have been devastating to the environ-
ments in developing nations.317 Additionally, development of regulatory
infrastructure is only one of GEF's many goals, all of which must fight over
its limited financing.
309. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
at 17, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/7 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M 455 (1983).
310. Agenda 21, supra note 192.
311. See Di Leva, supra note 181, at 527 passim; Boer, supra note 271, at 329-31.
312. See Boer, supra note 271, at 329 (discussing IUCN assistance); Di Leva, supra
note 181, at 534-36 (discussing the World Bank's assistance).
313. United Nations Environment Program, Environmental Law in the UNEP - Pro-
gram Element 4.3 (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.unep.no/unep/sub43.htm.
314. See Boer, supra note 271, at 329-331; Di Leva, supra note 181, at 533-34.
315. PERCIVAL r AL., supra note 17, at 1357.
316. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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Substantial amounts of foreign aid are needed to address the full range
of environmental needs that arise consequent to the development in such a
large percentage of the world.318 Given the current level of funding for
such services at GEF, UNEP and IUCN, however, nothing close to the
amount of aid needed is forthcoming.
Conclusion
Decision makers and academics in developed nations have emphasized
international law as the best means for regulating the environments of
developing nations.319 That emphasis should shift to developing and
expanding effective national environmental regulatory infrastructure in
developing nations. These systems should employ the expertise of and
receive financial assistance from developed nations and the international
community, but the emphasis must be on nationally oriented, as opposed
to internationally oriented, systems for several reasons. First, every envi-
ronmental problem emanates from a particular source in a particular
place. A national regulatory system will be more effective at local monitor-
ing and sanctioning. A national system also permits information to move
more freely between the community, the regulators, and the regulated. Sec-
ond, by its nature, international law is made up of broadly worded princi-
ples that 1) are not binding law until ratified by an individual nation and
2) are not useful until there is an institutional capability to adjudicate indi-
vidual cases.
Third, a NERI reflects the public will of that nation and is an expres-
sion of the choice of the sovereign. Therefore, it is more likely that a NERI
system will have the support of that government and of the public than
would an internationally established policing mechanism. Lastly, there are
simply not enough international or private resources to police the global
environment. The majority of the cost of the regulatory system must be
paid for out of the pockets of the developing nations, to which end the
pricing of goods and services available to the public must include not only
the cost of the environmental harms, but also the cost of the system of
environmental regulation itself.
There are compelling reasons why a NERI regime is beneficial both to
development and to the protection of the environment. Its benefit to the
latter should go without saying. As to the former, from the perspective of
the investor, a developed legal structure with clear rules regarding the
extent of a corporation's potential environmental liabilities will encourage
investment in that particular developing nation, thereby encouraging devel-
opment.320 If the host government were to upset the reliance of an invest-
318. See Lewis, supra note 259, at A3.
319. See, e.g., PERcivAL Er AL., supra note 17, at 1056 (discussing the history of regula-
tion of the environment of developing nations solely in the context of international law).
320. An adequate legal structure encourages reliance by the investor. "[G]overmnents
are recognizing that companies (and their financiers) need an indication of the liabilities
that might be imposed via changing environmental standards before they will make
large investments." BoND & CAR, supra note 91, at 34.
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ing corporation by changing the environmental law regime during the
project's lifetime, it would seriously jeopardize future foreign investments
in that country. Given the global competition for development capital, a
developing country should offer as much stability and certainty as it can to
potential investors. A developed national regulatory regime will do much
to promote stability and certainty.32 1
While there are major shortcomings in national environmental man-
agement regimes in developing nations, the developed world does commit
some resources to assisting developing nations to regulate their environ-
ments.32 2 National governments in developing nations have increasingly
enacted laws and regulations or have increased administrative and enforce-
ment mechanisms, almost invariably with some motivation or assistance
from developed nations.323 In the developed world, NGOs as well as
MDBs have committed resources to promoting and funding the develop-
ment of the environmental management capacity of developing nations,
including assistance with drafting and promulgating effective regulatory
instruments and with the cultivation of institutional capacity and enforce-
ment mechanisms.324 These international organizations have played and
will continue to play a very important role in building regulatory capacity
and capability in developing nations.3 25
However, more must be done. The great scale of the development of
physical infrastructure to serve more that three-quarters of the Earth's pop-
ulation must be paralleled by the development of national environmental
regulatory infrastructures. If it is not, it may well be that the grand physi-
cal structures were built for naught.
321. Such a developed regime, given the rapidly changing character of environmental
regulation at the national and international levels, could be given greater credibility if
combined with stabilization clauses or sovereign guarantees in any agreements between
the host sovereign and the project entity. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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